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THEAPPROACHESOFTHEEUROPEAN 
COMMISSION AND THE U.S. ANTITRUST 
AGENCIES TOWARDS EXCLUSMTY 
CLAUSES IN LICENSING AGREEMENTS 
SERGIO BACHES OPI* 
Abstract: This Article examines and compares the differing 
treatment of territorial restraints in licensing agreements under 
United States (U.S.) antitrust law and European Union (E.U.) 
competition law. 'While in the U.S. wrtical territorial restraints are 
assessed under the Rule of Reason, in the E.U. they often are 
considered illegal per se, unless exempt under the E.U. Technology 
Transfer Regulation or by an express decision of the Commission 
addressed to the parties to the licensing agreement. Yet, even if a 
licensing agreement is exempt under the E.U. Regulation, the 
Regulation imposes severe time limitations on exclusivity clauses. 
These different approaches in the U.S. and the E.U. may be 
explained by the fact that, unlike U.S. antitrust agencies, the 
Commission still perceives competition rules as an instrument to 
attain a wider objective: i.e. market integration. This Article 
concludes that, in view of the achievements of the market integration 
process in the E.U., it is time for the Commission to adopt a more 
liberal approach towards these types of clauses. 
INTRODUCTION 
This article contrasts the approaches taken by the U.S. courts and 
antitrust agencies and the Commission of the European Communities 
(the Commission) 011 clauses granting sole and exclusive licenses. A 
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partial fulfillment of the requirements to obtain a I\Iaster Degree in International Business 
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States and Spain to attend the Master Program at Fordham University. All opinions ex-
pressed in this Article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of Uria & 
Menendez or anyone else. 
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licensing agreement may involve exclusivity in different respects. The 
licensor may grant one or more sole licenses, which prohibit the li-
censor from granting others licenses to use the licensed technology, 
or one or more exclusive licenses, which restrain the licensor itself 
from using the technology, or a combination of both. 
Agreements involving sole and exclusive licenses may raise anti-
trust issues in myriad situations. Sometimes, a licensor grants absolute 
territorial protection to a licensee because the licensee otherwise may 
not be willing to make the necessary investments to set up a produc-
tion line and a distribution network for the licensed product or serv-
ice. In addition, a licensor may want to obtain from the licensee an 
exclusive license or the assignment of future improvements to or new 
applications of the licensed technology, thereby preventing the licen-
see from using its new improvements (exclusive grant-back clause). 
A license agreement also may contain a non-compete clause (ex-
clusive dealing). A non-compete clause prevents the licensee from 
licensing, using, or distributing goods produced under competing 
technologies. 
Finally, an exclusivity clause may be found in a license agreement 
between the parties in a horizontal relationship. Two parties to a 
horizontal relationship may agree to issue licenses for their respective 
technologies to each other on an exclusive basis (cross-licensing). 
This Article focuses its analysis on sole and exclusive licenses. 
This Article first analyzes the frameworks for evaluating antitrust 
restraints in the E.U. and the U.S. Next, it considers whether the U.S. 
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Propertyl and 
the E.U. Technology Transfer Block Exemption2 narrow the existing 
differences between the two enforcement systems' policies on exclu-
sivity clauses in license agreements or, rather, perpetuate the tradi-
tionally inconsistent approaches pursued by the E.U. and the U.S. 
1 U.S. Department ofJustke and Federal Trade COlIlmission Antitrust Guidelines for 
the Licensing of Intellectual Property (April 6, 1995), reP/in ted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 
, 13,132 [hereinafter IP Guidelines]. 
2 Commission Regulation No. 240/96 on the Application of Art. 85(3) of the Tn'aty to 
Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 1996 OJ. (L cU/2) [hereinafter 
indistinctly referred as the Regulation, the Technology Transfer Regulation, or Commis-
sion Regulation 240/96]. One of the most complete analyses of the Technology Transfer 
Regulation is found in V. KORAH, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AGREEMENTS AND THE EC COM-
PETITION RULES (l99i) [hereinafter Reg. l"Ionographl. Less elaborated analyses can be 
found in Jianming Shen, Block Exelllption for Technology Licensing Agreements Under COlllmission 
Regulatioll (EC) No. 240/96, 20 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REv. 251 (199i), and in Pierre Y.F. 
Bos & Marco M. Siotboom, The EC Technology Transfer Reglliation-A Practitioners' Perspective, 
32INT'LLAW.l (1998). 
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I. FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING ANTITRUST RESTRAINTS IN THE E.U. 
AND THE U.S. 
In order to understand why a licensing agreement may be subject 
to different substantive legal standards in the E.U. and the U.S., it is 
necessary to compare the frameworks for evaluating antitrust re-
straints applied by the Commission and the U.S. agencies. First, the 
Commission applies a restrictive approach towards restraints of con-
duct, whereas U.S. antitrust law employs a Rule of Reason analysis. 
Second, the Commission tends to consider as "horizontal agreements" 
those licensing agreements which U.S. agencies consider "vertical 
agreements."3 U.S. agencies analyze license agreements ex ante while 
the Commission often analyzes them ex post.4 Thus, the Commission 
often deems a license horizontal even if the licensee is not able to 
compete with the licensor but for the license. The underlying reason-
ing of the ex post analysis is that once the licensor has innovated and 
the licensee has established a production line and developed a mar-
ket, it is more competitive to have more finns in the market.5 
A. The Restrictive Approach Adopted by Commission Towards Restraints of 
Conduct 
1. The E.U. Block Exemption System 
The application of E.U. competition law is based on a dual en-
forcement system. The Commission, the national courts (NCs), and 
the administrative authorities (NAs) all have jurisdiction to apply Ar-
ticle 81 (1) of the EC Treaty.6 The drawback of this system is the risk of 
a lack of uniformity in the interpretation and application of the com-
petition rules of the EC Treaty.7 
3 Reg. Monograph. supra note 2. at 19-25. 
4/d. at 12-13. 
5 [d. at 242. 
6 TI'eaty establishing the European Community, Feb. 7. 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992). 
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573. 626 [hereinafter EC Treaty], inc011Jorat;ng ella Ilges made by Treaty on 
European Union. Feb. 7. 1992, OJ. (C224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719. The EC 
Treaty was amended by the Treaty of Amstenlam, Oct. 2, 1997. OJ. (C 340) 1 (1997). Mter 
the amendment introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty have become Articles 81 and 82 l·especth·eIy. Fm the sake of clarity, this Article will 
refer only to formel' Article 85 as Article 81, unless fonner Article 85 is mentioned in the 
title of an official document. 
7 See R. JOLIET, RULE OF REASON IN ANTITRUST LAw 174 (1967); see also M. WaeIbroek, 
Antitrust Analysis Under Article 85(1) and Article 85(3), in 1987 FORDHAIII CORP. L. INST. 693, 
697 (Barry Hawk ed., 1988). 
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In the early 1960s, there was a risk that the application of EC 
competition law by NCs and NAs with diverse legal traditions was a 
danger to the uniform application of EC competition law in all Mem-
ber States.8 Perhaps the Commission reasoned that the most effective 
way to limit the discretion of national competition authorities was to 
interpret the prohibition of Article 81 (1) as broadly as possible.9 The 
exclusive power vested in the Commission to grant individual exemp-
tions under Article 81 (3) allowed this broad interpretation. lO This 
broad interpretation of Article 81 (1) led the Commission to apply 
Article 81 (1) to agreements regardless of whether the restraints of 
conduct contained therein had pro-competitive effects or had few or 
no anti-competitive effects.!l 
As a result of the broad application of Article 81 (1), the Commis-
sion began to experience a backlog in the notifications,l2 and its offi-
cials feared that the Commission would receive a flood of notifications 
of agreements that did not raise significant competition concerns. l3 
In order to reduce the Commission's workload, to accelerate the re-
view of individual notifications and other antitrust files, and ostensibly 
to promote legal certainty,l4 the Commission decided to rely on block 
exemptions to exempt automatically certain categories of agree-
ments.!5 
8 SeeV. KORAH, EC COMPETITION LAw AND PRACTICE 125 (6th ed. 1997) [hereinafter 
Introductory Guide). 
9 Ian S. Forrestel" & Christopher Norall, The Laicization of Community Law: Self-Help and 
the RulR of Reason: How Competition Law Is and Could Be Applied, 21 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 11, 
22 (1984). 
10 Introductory Guide, supra note 8, at 63; Korah, From Legal Toward Economic Effi-
ciency-ArticlR 85(1) of the EEC Treaty in Contrast to U.S., ANTITRUST BULL., 1009, 1015 
(1990). 
1\ Barry E. Hawk, System Failure: Vertical Restraints and the EC Competition Law, 32 
C.M.L.R. 973, 974-75 (1995);JOLIET, supra note 7, at 174. 
12 Regulation 17/62 introduced a notification system and granted the Commission the 
exclusive power to grant individual exemptions under Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty, 
1959-1962 OJ. SPEC. ED. 87. 
13 D.G. GOYDER, EEC COMPETITION LAw 57-58 (1988); Donald L. Holley, EEC Competi-
tion Practice; A Thirt.v-Year Retrospective, 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 342, 358-59 (1992-93). 
Korah points out that the Commission l"eceh'ed about 30,000 notifications of exclusive 
distribution agl"eements soon after Regulation 17/62 was passed. Introductory Guide, 
supra note 8, at 194. 
H See Sebastiano Gutusso, Techllology Trallsfer ,1greelllellts Ullder EC Lalli, in 1994 FORD-
HAM CORP. L. IN ST. 227, 236 (Barry Hawk ed., 1995); Holley, Sill)/"(( notel:~, at 359-60. 
15 Christopher Bright, i1 COlllpmisoll of the EC alld the U.S. Prol)osals Relatillg to the Allti-
trust Treatment of Technology Licellsillg A.greelllellts, ill 2 1996 INT'L INTELL. PROP. LA\\, & POL'y 
33-1,33-5 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1998). 
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Under Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty, however, it was unclear 
whether the Commission had the power to issue block exemptions.16 
Thus, the Commission obtained that power from the Council of the 
European Communities through Regulation 19/65)7 The group ex-
emption method is, to a certain extent, a self-regulatory mechanism. 
If parties construct their agreements so that they fit v.rithin block ex-
emptions, they can be certain that the agreements do not violate Arti-
cle 81(1).18 
2. The Relationship Between Article 81 (3) of the EC Treaty and the 
Rule of Reason 
The block exemption system has been criticized for being too 
formalistic and incapable of curing the main shortcoming of the EC 
competition system-the lack of efficient substantive analysis to assess 
the likely competitive harm of an agreement.l9 Agreements that do 
not fit into one of the block exemptions or that do not yield the bene-
fits described in Article 81 (3) violate Article 81 (1), even if they do not 
significantly impair competition.20 Consequently, some scholars advo-
cated for the Commission's employment of a less legalistic approach 
that would place greater emphasis on factual economic cOllsidera-
tions. 21 
16 Introductory Guide, slljml note 8, at 7l. 
17 Regulation 19/65, on Application of Article 85('\) of the Treaty to Certain Catego-
ries of Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1965 OJ. 36/533. 
18 The Commission has withdrawn the exemption onl" in one case. See Case T-7/93, 
Langnese-Iglo, 1995 E.C.R. II-1533, " 209-10. The Commission is more likely to threaten 
the parties to withdraw an exemption than to persuade them to amend the agreement in 
accordance with its views. This approach was taken in Tetra Pak I. 88/501/EEC, 4 C.M.L.R. 
479 (1990). The Commission's decision was upheld on appeal by the c'F.1. Case T-51/89, 
Tetra Pak Rausing SA v. Commission, 1990 E.C.R. II-309; see D.G. GOYDER, EC COMPETI-
TION LAW 287 (3d ed. 1998). 
19 Hawk, supm note 11, at 986. 
20Id. at 115. The leading case to understand how both the E.CJ. and the Commission 
have applied this rigid and formalistic approach towards vertical restraints is Cases 56 & 
58/64, Etablissements Consten SA and Gnmdig-Verkaufs-GmbH \'. EEC Commission, 1966 
E.C.R. 299 [hereinafter Costen and Gnmdig]. In this case, the E.CJ. upheld a decision by 
the Commission prohibiting an exdush'e distribution agl'eement without even inquiring 
into its possible pro-('()Jllpetitive effects in the market. 
21 Hawk, sltjJm note 11 ;JOLIET, slljHa note 7; V. Korah, EEC Licensing of In tellectllal ProjJ-
erty, FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. LJ., 5~), 79 (199:\); see Forrester & Norall, slIjJm 
note 9, at 37; Emmanuel P. Mastromanolis, Insightsfi'olll U.S. Alltitrust Lalli on Exclusive and 
RRsi1icted Tenit01ial Dislliblltion: The Creation of a Nelli Legal Standard for EurojJeml Union COIll-
jJetitionLalll, 15 U. PA.J. INT'L Bus. L. 559, 610-14 (1998). 
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Nonetheless, the Commission frequently has refused to adopt a 
more flexible approach in its application of Article 81(1).22 The 
Commission has stressed that its analysis under Article 81 (3) takes 
into account economic considerations because that analysis takes 
place at the stage of the Rule of Reason analysis.23 Moreover, the 
Commission opines that the introduction of a full-blown Rule of Rea-
son in its application of Article 81 (1) would lead to the setting aside 
of competition rules on the grounds of political or non-economic 
considerations, such as environmental or social concerns.24 The 
Commission seems to rely on a simplistic view of the Rule of Reason 
and also appears to misunderstand the nature of this rule. Article 
81 (3) of the EC Treaty is not the equivalent of the Rule of Reason. 25 
First, Article 81 (3) exhaustively lists the factors the Commission 
must consider in order to decide whether to grant an exemption. The 
Rule of Reason analysis, in contrast, entails a more flexible inquiry 
that varies in focus and detail depending on the nature of the agree-
ment and on market circumstances. 26 The U.S. agencies may consider 
factors in their overall analysis such as those listed in Article 81 (3) 
but, unlike in the E.U. exemption system, the U.S. Rule of Reason 
analysis is less rigid because no factor is dispositive in that analysis.27 
The requirements that an agreement must fulfill under Article 
81 (3) are more extensive than those of the U.S. Rule of Reason. Arti-
22 In its "White Paper on l\Iodernization of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 
of the EC Treaty," 1999 OJ. (C 132) 1 [hereinafter "\\11ite Paper"], the Commission ex-
plicitly refused to adopt a Rule of Reason approach. The Commission's refusal was based 
on four arguments: (i) it would require a reform of the EC Treaty; (ii) Article 81 (3) of the 
EC Treaty already contains the elements of a Rule of Reason; (iii) the modernization of 
the application of EC Competition law cannot be made dependant upon developments in 
decision-making practice; and (iv) a Rule of Reason approach could lead to the setting 
aside of competition rules because of political considerations. Id. at § 57. 
23 See Gutusso, slljna note 14, at 2'~5-36. 
24 See White Paper, supra note 22, point (iv). 
25 Account must be taken of the fact that, even in the U.S., the Rule of Reason concept 
remains vague, despite being the dominant form of analysis for Section 1 Sherman Act 
cases. Thomas A. Piraino,]r., j"[(lking Sense of the Rule of Reasoll: A Sew Standard for Sertion 1 
of the Shennan Act, 47 VAND. L. RET. 175,~, 1764 (1994). 
26 California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 52!) U.S. 75G, 778-81 (l!)!)!); Indiana Fed'n of Den-
tists, 476 U.S. 447, 459-61 (198!); Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n \'. B<\' of Regents, -HiS 
U.S. 85, 104-lC~ (1984) [hereinafter SCM]. See also Antitrust Guidelines for Collabora-
tions Among Competitors (Oct. 1. 1999), 'l! 1.2, available at http:! h\'\\'\\'.usdoj.gov/ [here-
inafter Antitrust Guidelines]. 
27 In Continental T\:, Illc. lI. GTE Sviliania, Inc., the Court held that, "[u]nder this rule 
the factfinder weighs all of the circulllstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive 
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition." 433 
U.S. 36, 49 (1977); see also Antitrust Guidelines, supra note 26, 'l! 1.2. 
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cle 81 (3) requires the Commission to determine whether the agree-
ment improves distribution or production or promotes technical or 
economic progress, and whether consumers are being allowed a fair 
share of the benefits resulting from such improvements. Moreover, 
the claimed restriction must be "indispensable" for the attainment of 
these objectives and must not afford firms the possibility of eliminat-
ing competition in respect to a substantial part of the products in 
question.28 
The initial inquiry under a Rule of Reason analysis is whether the 
challenged agreement is lillely to harm competition and deprive con-
sumers of the advantages of a freely competitive system.29 Only when 
this initial inquiry is answered in the affirmative will U.S. authorities 
engage in a full market analysis.3o This full market analysis weighs the 
anti-competitive effects of the restrictive agreement with its pro-
competitive effects. Under the Rule of Reason, however, the essential 
question is not whether the claimed restrictions are "indispensable" to 
improve production or distribution, or to promote technical progress, 
but rather whether the anti-competitive effects of the restrictive 
agreement outweigh its pro-competitive effects.31 In the field of verti-
cal restraints, this inquiry requires the decision-maker to balance the 
fact that the protection granted under the agreement may be neces-
sary to induce the dealer to invest in advertising, promotion, and pro-
viding information and service to customers with the potential harms 
to competition that may arise from the agreement by increasing the 
ability or incentive to raise prices or reduce output, quality, service, or 
innovation below what it likely would be in the absence of the agree-
ment.32 Thus, the difference between the two systems is apparent: in 
the U.S., an agreement in principle may escape the prohibition of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act without being indispensable to improv-
ing distribution or production and without giving consumers a fair 
28 See Consten and Grundig. 1966 E.C.R. at 348; Case 258/78, Nungessel' v. Commis-
sion, 1982 E.C.R. 2073,,77. 
29 The Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors seem to indicate that, fOl' 
the U.S. agencies, the ultimate aim of antitrust laws is to protect consumer welfal'e. See 
§§ 2.1., 3.2., and 3.36. In light of its judgment in the State Oil Co. 11. Khan case, the Supreme 
Court also appeal's to consider consumer welfal'e as the ultimate goal of antitrust laws. 522 
U.S. 3, 15 (1997). 
30 See IP Guidelines, supra note 1, § 3.4; see also NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103-04. 
31 Eleanor Fox, Alaize Seed: A Comparatille COllllllellt, il1 1982 FORDHAM CORP. L. INsT. 
151,157,159 (Barry Hawk ed., 1983); V. Korah, The Effect ofEEe Com/letitia//' Rules 011 Distli-
butiim ofC.oods and Services in Europe, in 1 1996 INT'L INTELL. PROP. LAW & POL'y 395, 398-
99 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1996). 
32 Fox, supra note 31, at 157. 
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share of the benefits, or simply without improving distribution or 
production, provided it is not likely to harm competition.33 
Second, contrary to the Commission's understanding of the Rule 
of Reason, the Rule of Reason does not induce antitrust authorities to 
consider non-economic factors in the antitrust analysis. The Rule of 
Reason analysis is based exclusively on competitive considerations.34 
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence shows that courts may take into 
account policy or social considerations only to decide whether a spe-
cific restrictive practice is given "per se" treatment, "quick look" 
treatment, or "full-blown" Rule of Reason treatment. 35 
3. The U.S. Approach: the Creation of the Rule of Reason to Limit 
the Prohibition of Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
Unlike the Commission, the U.S. agencies and courts distinguish 
between restraints that are per se illegal and those that merit a Rule of 
Reason analysis. 36 Unlike Article 81, Section 1 of the Sherman Act 
does not provide for the granting of exemptions. Therefore, in prin-
ciple, all restraints of trade are prohibited. The absurdity of this solu-
tion led to the development of the ancillary restraints doctrine and, 
soon thereafter, the doctrine of the Rule of Reason to narrow the 
general prohibition of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. 37 
In the ground-breaking case of Addyston Pipe and Steel Co., Judge 
Taft, writing for the circuit court, distinguished between ancillary re-
33 This difference was highlighted by Rene Joliet in 1967. See JOLIET, supra note 7, at 
115. 
34 For instance, in NCAA, the Supreme Court rejected the promotion of amateurism in 
college football as a validjustification for a television plan adopted by the National Colle-
giate Athletic Association which limited the number of games that anyone team could 
televise and the price for the particular telecasts. 468 U.S. at 100-01; see also Jan Peeters, 
The Rille of Reason Revisited: Prohibition on Restraints of Com/letitio/! in the Shennan Act and the 
EEC Treaty, 37 AM.]. COMPo L. 521, 530-31 (1989). 
35 See Califomia Dental.1ss'n., 526 U.S. at 771 (the lower court should have used a "less 
quick look" Rule of Reason analysis because the restraints on advertising may have had 
pro-competitive effects by preventing misleading or false quality claims); United States v. 
Brown Univ., 5 F.'~d 658, 669 (3nl Cir. 1993) (inappropriate use of the "quick look" Rule of 
Reason because lower court did not take into account the nature of highel' education and 
pro-consumer features of the agreement); NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 (inappropriate use of the 
per se analysis because restraints of competition are essential if the product-college foot-
ball-is to be available at all). 
36 For a detailed analysis of the development of the Rule of Reason hy the Supreme 
Court and lower courts see AREEDA & HO\'ENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW eh. 15 (1999 Supp.), 
and DANIELJ. GIFFORD & LEO]' R'.SKIND, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW CASES AND !\!ATERL\LS 
37-97 (1998). 
37 Forrester & Norall, slljJra note 9, at 20-1. 
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straints and naked restraints.38 According to Judge Taft, an agreement 
is a reasonable restraint of trade only if it is incidental or ancillary to 
another agreement whose main objective is pro-competitive.39 The 
rationale for this distinction is found in the need to introduce a judi-
cially manageable standard in the courts' reasoning for assessing re-
straints of trade.40 The ancillary restraint doctrine allows judges to 
determine when a restraint is necessary to make viable a pro-
competitive transaction. In contrast, using this analysis for naked re-
straints, such as the price-fixing practices scrutinized in this case, 
would force a judge to perform an inappropriate function, detennin-
ing whether the fixed prices are reasonable.41 To justif}' a cartel on the 
grounds that the prices fixed are reasonable is, as Judge Taft indi-
cated, to "set sail on a sea of doubt. "42 
In 1911, the Supreme Court endorsed the Rule of Reason ap-
proach in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States43 and in United 
States v. American Tobacco CO.44 Under the Rule of Reason analysis, Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act applies only to restraints that are unrea-
sonable (those whose anti-competitive effects outweigh their pro-
competitive effects). Only naked restraints (for instance, those which 
have no purpose other than restricting output and raising prices, such 
as price fixing, horizontal territorial or customer allocation, minimum 
resale price maintenance, and certain tying arrangements) are per se 
illegal.45 Restrictive agreements are presumed valid until challenged. 
B. The Application of the Rule of Reason Analysis to Vertical Restraints: The 
Conflicting Approaches of the Commission and the u.s. Agencies 
Regarding the Characterization of License Agreements as Horizontal or 
Vertical 
1. The Economics of Vertical Restraints 
The compatibility of an agreement with antitrust law may depend 
substantially upon whether the agreement qualifies as vertical or hori-
38 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aiI'd. 175 U.S. 211 (1899). 
39 ]d. 
40 ]d. at 282. 
41 Reg. Monograph, slljJra 110te 2, at 14. 
42 85 F. at 284. 
43 221 U.S. 1,69-70 (1911). 
44221 U.S. 106, 180-81 (l911). 
45 HERBERT Hm'ENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, 227-28 (1994). 
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zontal. Both the Commission46 and the U.S. agencies consider vertical 
restraints less harmful to competition than horizontal restraints.47 
There is an assumption that the advantages of vertical restraints. in 
promoting interbrand competition outweigh their anti-competitive 
effects on intrabrand competition.48 In a vertical agreement, each of 
the parties has an interest in having the other produce more, because 
that is the rational way to maximize their respective profits; in a hori-
zontal agreement, each party has an interest in having the other pro-
duce less.49 
The Commission has taken a less flexible position towards verti-
cal restraints than the U.S. agencies. There are two connected factors 
driving these two approaches towards vertical restraints: (i) the strong 
influence which the economic model proposed by the Chicago 
School has exerted upon the U.S. agencies and courts, and (ii) the 
E. U.' s objective of achieving an integrated market. 
a. The Chicago School Approach 
U.S. agencies and courts have been strongly influenced by the 
economists of the Chicago Schoo1.50 According to this school of 
thought, vertical restraints almost never restrict competition, unless 
one of the parties enjoys significant market power in the relevant 
market.51 Instead, vertical restraints foster interbrand competition by 
increasing output and diminishing distribution costs. 
The Chicago School stresses that, in a vertical relationship, both 
the manufacturer and the dealer want production to increase in order 
to maximize their returns, whereas parties to a horizontal agreement 
generally want to cut down on production for the sake of monopolis-
tic gains.52 With a vertical restraint, both manufacturer and consumer 
want distribution to occur at the lowest possible cost in order to dis-
tribute as much product as possible. Therefore, Chicago School 
economists conclude that when a manufacturer chooses to impose a 
46 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, COM(96) 721 final, 
Brussels, 22.01.1997, [1997J 4 C.M.L.R. 519, 522,11 10. 
47 See GIFFORD & RASKIND, sllpra note 36, at 147-59. 
48 In the U.S., the leading cases in this respect are Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (non-price ver-
tical restraints) and State Oil Co., 522 U.S. 3 (maximum verti('al price fixing). 
49 Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 290 (1978/1993). 
50 Carey R. Ramos & Aidan Synnott, Antitrust Issues in the Licensing of Intellectllal Property, 
519 PUlPal 7,10 (1998). 
,;J BORK, supra note 49, at 290. 
52 Id. at 289. 
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vertical restraint upon its dealers, it chooses based upon criteria that 
also control consumer welfare. Because lower distribution costs are 
one aspect of the overall efficiency of a finn, as a manufacturer be-
comes more effective in selling its brand, competition among manu-
facturers intensifies and output increases.53 Since the manufacturer 
that imposes vertical restraints cannot intend to restrict output, ac-
cording to the Chicago School, it instead must create efficiencies. The 
underlying thought is that a manufacturer does not have any incen-
tive to protect one dealer from other dealers unless that protection is 
necessary to induce one dealer to make investments in advertising, 
promotion, or services for the benefit of the brand as a whole or for 
the benefit of consumers.54 Since vertical restraints are unlikely to 
harm competition because interbrand competition always provides a 
check on intrabrand restraints, some Chicago School economists have 
advocated for the per se legality of vertical restraints.55 
This approach has been contested by other economists because it 
is premised on the assumption that the manufacturer always makes 
rational choices as to the amount of protection that its dealers need 
to make the necessary amount of investments to promote the brand.56 
Chicago School economists do not take into account the fact that a 
manufacturer may want to attract certain marginal consumers (for 
instance, high income consumers) by encouraging its dealers to offer 
further and better services. In order to comply with the manufac-
turer's plan, the dealers might request a level of protection higher 
than the level they need to promote the brand, leading to higher 
dealer margins and profits.57 The result is that the higher price osten-
sibly needed to support new services worsens the welfare of those non-
marginal consumers by forcing them to pay for services they do not 
desire or by inducing them to purchase a substitute good or service 
that they otherwise would regard as inferior.58 It is the presence of the 
non-marginal purchasers that breaks the link, claimed to exist by Chi-
53 fd. at 290. 
54 fd. at 295-97. 
55 !d. at 291; Richard A. Posner, The Next Stefl ill the Antitm.lt Tr('{[tlllfllt oj Restricted Disfli-
butioll: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. RE\". 6, 8 (1981); Frank Easterbrook, l'erticat A.rrallge-
menis alld the Rutf' oj Reason, 53 /tNTITRUST LJ. 135, 169 (1984). 
56 PHILIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAw 165-66 (1989). 
57 !d. at 164, 166. 
58 fd. at 166. 
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cago School economists, between manufacturer choice and consumer 
welfare.59 
The Chicago School would counter that consumer welfare is af-
fected negatively only when consumers who do not want particular 
services cannot turn to other brands. However, even if a manufacturer 
does not have market power, vertical restraints still can harm competi-
tion when several manufacturers collectively dominate a large market 
share and they adopt a strategy of extensive services.60 
U.S. agencies and courts have not fully upheld the extreme ap-
proach of the Chicago School because of the possible mistakes which 
the manufacturer could make regarding the protection needed to 
induce dealers' investments. Nonetheless, the Chicago School has had 
a strong influence on the development of Supreme Court case law 
regarding vertical restraints. In Sylvania,61 the Supreme Court over-
ruled its previous ruling in the Schwinn case62 and endorsed the Rule 
of Reason analysis as the appropriate method to evaluate the com-
patibility of non-price vertical restraints.63 Before Sylvania, vertical re-
straints were presumed to be unreasonable and, therefore, per se ille-
ga1.64 The Schwinn rule is the approach often followed by the 
Commission. 
In contrast with its Schwinn reasoning, the Supreme Court rea-
soned in Sylvania that vertical restrictions may promote interbrand 
competition by allowing a manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies 
in the distribution of its products. The Supreme Court endorsed the 
Chicago School's view that interbrand competition provides a signifi-
cant check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power because of 
consumers' ability to substitute a different branch of the same prod-
59 Id. at 167; see also S. Comanor, l'ertical Price-Fixing, l'ertical Restlictions and the New 
Antirust Policy, 98 HAR\,. L. RE\,. 983, 990, 999, 1001 (1985). According to Comanor, 
"[e]conomic theory alone cannot predict whether the imposition of vertical restraints-
and dealel"s provision of additional services-will benefit and enhance efficiency, V,11ether 
consumers benefit depends on whether gains to , , , [service seeking) consumers outweigh 
losses to ... [price-seeking consumers)." In the E.U., some econolllists also have endorsed 
the idea that both non-price and price vertical restraints lIlay either promote or reduce 
economic efficiency. David Deacon, l'ertical Restraints Under EU Competition Law: New Direc-
tions, in 1995 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 307,317-18 (Barry Hawk ed., 1996). 
60 AREEDA, supra note 56, at lli7-68. 
61 Sylvania, 433 U.S. at :)8. 
62 United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). 
63 S,'lvallia, 4,~3 U.S. at 59. 
64 Id. at 52. 
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uct. 65 The VIew of the Chicago School is far from being widely ac-
cepted among economists and regulators. Some commentators have 
argued that there is no a priori basis to assume that sacrificing intra-
brand competition to invigorate interbrand competition is a welfare-
enhancing trade-off.66 For this reason, I believe the approach taken by 
the U.S. courts towards vertical restraints is much more realistic than 
the approach proposed by the Chicago School. There are reasons to 
support the view that market analysis under the Rule of Reason is re-
quired before concluding that a vertical restraint escapes the prohibi-
tion of Section 1 of the Shennan Act on the grounds that it promotes 
interbrand competition. 
Although vertical restraints may jumpstart interbrand competi-
tion, they also may produce an increase in retail gross margins, lead-
ing to higher retail prices, a fall in non-marginal consumer surplus 
and, eventually, a decrease in industry surplus. Moreover, vertical re-
straints may help shield an inefficient group of distributors from mar-
ket entry by more efficient distributors.67 This situation may arise 
when a horizontal cartel of dealers representing a large market share 
is able to force a manufacturer to grant it protection against other 
more efficient dealers. 
Furthermore, empirical evidence shows that intrabrand vertical 
restraints do not always promote interbrand competition. In the U.S., 
there are industries where vertical restraints do not seem to have any 
significant pro-competitive effects on interbrand competition. For 
instance, a study of the blue jean industry demonstrated that, as in-
trabrand competition increases, there are higher margins at the 
manufacturer level, as well as reduced distribution costs that are 
passed along to consumers.68 The dominant manufacturer in the U.S. 
blue jean market, Levi Strauss, operated under a resale price mainte-
nance (RPM) scheme, but as a result of a complaint issued by the FTC 
65 Id. On remand, the district court held that the territorial location clause that was in 
dispute was reasonable because the restraint was more likely to promote than supress in-
terbrand competition. The Coun of Appeals affirmed and, despite I'ecognizing that Syh'a-
nia did check intrabrand competition, it considered that this was an "inevitable incident to 
Sylvania's attempt to promote and maintain interbrand competition ... [I] t is important 
to emphasize that ... in a mal'ket dominaled by a single company (RCA), Sylvania pos-
sessed only a minor fraction of the lolal markel, Ihat many othel' hl'am\s wel'e available to 
the consumer ... [and] that Sylvania dealers could and did carry competing brands." GTE 
Sylvania Inc. \'. Continenlal T.Y. Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1000-01 (91h Cir. 1976). 
66 Roben L. Sleiner, II/trabral/d COlllprtitioll-StejJChild of Antitrllst. ,~6 ANTITRUST BULL. 
155,177 (1991). 
67 Id. '11 177. 
GB Id. at 179. 
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against Levi Strauss's pricing policies, Levi Strauss abandoned its RPM 
scheme. This change led to more intrabrand competition which sub-
sequently had the effect of reducing Levi Strauss dealers' markups 
and consumer prices on Levi jeans. The price reduction of the lead-
ing brand forced down the retail prices of rival brands, thereby in-
creasing interbrand competition. The Levi example confirms that, in 
certain industries, the onset of intrabrand competition first forces 
down margins and prices of well-known brands. Then interbrand 
competition is stimulated because the price of competing goods is 
also depressed.69 
b. Market Integration 
In contrast to U.S. antitrust law, EC competition law underscores 
the goal of market integration as embedded in the EC Treaty.70 In the 
E.U., the integration of different geographic markets is an independ-
ent objective of antitrust law.71 The goal of single market integration 
has played a significant role in the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Justice (E.CJ.) and the Court of First Instance (C.F.I.) in 
their applications of the provisions of the EC Treaty ranging from free 
movement of goods72 to the use of intellectu~l property rights.73 The 
E.CJ. and the C.F.I. also have taken into account the need to avoid 
market division when deciding on the compatibility of agreements 
with EC competition law. This jurisprudence endorses the Commis-
sion's concern that vertical agreements are partitioning devices of the 
common market. 74 
69 Robert Steiner, Sv/vania Econolllics-A Oiliqlle, 60 ANTITRUST, L.J. 41, 44 (1991). 
70 See Deacon, slipra note 59, at 308. In explaining the Commission's approach to verti-
cal restraints, Deacon states: "territorial exclusivity in particular was considel'ed as conu'ary 
to one of the fundamental aims of the Comlllunity-the Cl'eation of a real internal/single 
market. Such restrictions appeared to contribute both to the continued division of the 
market along national lines and the maintenance of price differences between Member 
States." 
71 See Mastromanolis, slipra note 21, at 560-61; Ronald 'N. Davis & Eric Castinel, Avoid-
ing the Pitfalls ofEC Distriblltion Lalli, 7-SUM ANTITRUST 33, ,t) (1 !J93). 
i2 See Articles 28, 29, 30 of the EC Treaty as alnentied by the Treaty of Amsterdam (ex 
Articles 30, 34, 36), slll)ra note 6. 
73 See Case 15/74, Centrafann BV,·. Sterling Drug. Inc., 1974 E.C.R. 1147. In this case, 
the E.CJ, enunciated the so-called exhallstion doctrine. The E.CJ held that it "'as con-
trary to Articles 28 and 30 of the Treaty fi)}' a patentee to assert its patent rights in one 
Member State to prevent parallel imports of patented products placed in the market of 
another Member State by the patentee or with its consent. 
74 ClltllSSO, supra note 14, at 237. The goal of market integration explains the restric-
tive appl'oach towards ,'ertical restraints and the fact that the leading case in this field, 
Consten and Gl'lmdig, has not been overruled. In Consten and Grundig, the E.CJ. reasoned 
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2. The U.S. Agencies' Application of the Rule of Reason to License 
Agreements 
99 
The U.S. agencies note in the Intellectual Property Guidelines 
that they will apply the general framework of the Rule of Reason 
analysis to evaluate vertical restraints and also to assess the legality of 
licensing agreements. 75 This approach is consistent with the economic 
efficiencies attributed to license agreements. 76 The U.S. agencies 
note, however, that licensing agreements may contain restraints that 
are unlawful per se, such as price fixing, output restraints, boycotts, 
and market allocations. 77 
The application of the Rule of Reason analysis to license agree-
ments by the U.S. agencies and courts contrasts with the more formal-
istic approach adopted by the Commission, partially because the 
Commission and the U.S. agencies differ in their characterization of 
licensing agreements.78 In the U.S., a licensing agreement is vertical 
if, at the time it was negotiated, the licensee could not have entered 
the market without assistance from the licensor. 79 This analysis is an ex 
ante analysis. The Commission, in contrast, often relies on an ex post 
analysis of the license agreement in question. As a result, the Commis-
sion tends to consider most patent licenses as horizontal agreements 
even if the licensees would not have been able to compete with the 
licensors but for the licenses.so This ex post analysis explains why the 
Commission included some restrictions in the black list of the Tech-
nology Transfer Regulation, adopted pursuant to Article 81 (3) of the 
that "[ t] he principle of freedom of competition concerns the vario\ls stages and manifesta-
tions of competition. Although competition between pmd\lCel'S is generally more notice-
able than that between distributors of the same make, it does I/ot thereby follow that an agree-
ment tending to restrict the latter hind of competition should escape the /Jrohibition oj ArticlR 85(1) 
merefcy because it might increase the Jonllel;" (Emphasis added.) Consten and Gnmdig, 1966 
E.C.R. at 342; see also Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, 
COM(96) 721 final, Brussels, 22.01.1997, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 519, 520, ,1. 
75 IP Guidelines, supra note 1, § 3.4. 
76 fd. § 2.3. 
77 !d. 
7S Reg. Monograph, sll/na note 2, at 19-25. 
79 IP G\lidelines, s\lpra note 1, § 3.3. 
80 James Venit, In the 1I01w oJ Will dsltlfing: Patellt Licl'IIsillg ill the ComlllOIl Market, ill 1986 
FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. 517,529 (Bany Hawk ed .. 1987). Venit points O\lt that "in Maize 
Seeds, the European COlII't appears to have implicitly rejected the Commission's assump-
tions concerning the importance to be attached to the fact that both licensor and licensee 
are manufacturers .... " fd. 
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EC Treaty, such as quantity restrictions, customers' restrictions, and 
exclusive dealing (non-competition) clauses.81 
The IP Guidelines follow a more economic approach than the 
Technology Transfer Regulation in determining whether a particular 
restraint in a licensing agreement is compatible with Section I of the 
Sherman Act. A Rule of Reason analysis requires a comprehensive 
economic inquiry into the market conditions (such as the market 
power of the parties to the licensing agreement, the level of concen-
tration in the market, and the barriers to entry) .82 
The significant weight that the U.S. agencies place on market 
analysis contrasts with the absence of a similar concern regarding 
market power in the European group exemptions. Market analysis 
plays a limited role in the application of the Technology Transfer 
Regulation. However, market power may be relevant in two situations: 
(i) to trigger a decision of the Commission withdrawing the benefit of 
the exemption when the licensed products do not have real competi-
tion in the licensed territory,83 and (ii) to benefit from the block ex-
emption when a parent undertaking grants the joint venture a patent 
or know-how license, since the Regulation conditions its application 
to these agreements to those licensed products not exceeding certain 
market share thresholds.84 
Some practitioners and scholars consider the formalistic ap-
proach of the Technology Transfer Regulation to be an advantage of 
the E.U. system. They argue that, because of the Regulation, it is eas-
ier under EC competition law than under U.S. antitrust law to deter-
mine whether a licensing agreement is legally enforceable.85 On the 
81 Reg. Monograph, sllpra note 2, at 23. 
82 This comprehensive analysis of the market is somehow mitigated when courts rely 
on the so-<,alled "Quick Look" Rule of Reason. See Cali/orllia Dental Ass'n, 526 U.S. at 778-
81; see also Fox, supra note 31, at 156; Korah, slIpra note 31, at :396. 
83 Article 7 (l) of the Technology Transfer Regulation empowers the Commission to 
withdraw the exemption where it finds that an exempted agreement nevertheless has cer-
tain effects which al'e incolllpatible with the conditions laid down in Article 81 (3) of the 
EC Treaty and, in particular, when the effect of the agreement is to prevent the licensed 
products from being exposed to competition in the licensed te!Titory from identical or 
interchangeable goods or services "which may in particulal' occur where the licensee's 
market share exceeds 40%." It is not dear, howen'I', whether one has to assess the lin'n-
see's market share at the date of the license or at the time the COlllmission is deciding 
whether to withdraw the exemption. See Reg. Monograph, sll/)ra note 2, at 242. 
84 The licensed products must not exceed 20% or 10% in the market /01' the licensed 
products depending on whether the license CO\Trs production or distribution and produc-
tion respectively. COlIlmission Regulation 240/9G, art. 5 (2). I !J9(j OJ (L :\1) 2. 
85 Ronald v\'. Davis &: l\J. Elaine Johnstoll. COlltrast or COIllII'I~~ellce? The IP Guidelines (lnd 
the Nel/J Elf Technology Tralls/er Bloc/{ ExellljJtion, 9 ANTITRUST I G, 17 (1995). 
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other hand, block exemptions may constrain companies and cause 
them to structure their agreements in the way contemplated by the 
group exemption, despite the fact that more efficient structures ex-
ist.86 
The existence of different frameworks in the E.U. and the U.S. 
influences the way both competition authorities analyze specific re-
strictions of conduct in licensing agreements. In the E.U., Article 81 
of the EC Treaty prohibits (and nullifies under Article 81 (2» all re-
strictive license agreements, regardless of whether those agreements 
are pro-competitive, unless the agreements have been formally ex-
empted pursuant to an individual decision under Article 81 (3) or fall 
under the Technology Transfer Regulation.87 In contrast, in the U.S., 
restrictions in licensing agreements are deemed to be valid and en-
forceable without the need for individual approval by the U.S. agen-
cies until they are challenged.88 
3. The E.C]. 's Attempts to Develop a Rule of Reason-Oriented 
Approach: Conflict Between the E.C]. and the Commission 
The E.C]. has applied a more flexible approach to vertical re-
straints than the Commission,89 although the Commission has at times 
86 See Fon-ester & Norall, sll/Jm note 9, at 25. 
87 Gutusso, supm note 14, al 235. The Commission has, howe\'('r, miligaled the broad 
prohibition of A.rticle 81 (1) by introducing a "de minimis" rule, sl'e the last version of the 
"de minimis" rule in Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Imponance, 1997 OJ. 
(C 372) 13, and by deciding some cases under the ancillarv restraints doctrine. See Com-
mission Decision No. 90/410 EEC, 1990 OJ. (L209) 15 (Elopak/Metal Box-Odin). 
88 Davis &Johnston, slI/Jm nole 85, at Hi. 
89 Sfl' Case 234/89, Stergios Delimitis \'. Henninger Briiu, 1991 E.C.R. 935. In Delilllitis, 
the E.CJ. ruled that an agreemenl has to be analyzed within its "legal and economic con-
text" in order to show whether it has the effect of restricting competition. !d. Therefore, 
the Court in De/illli/is stressed the imporlance of looking in a realistic way at the anti-
competitive eflect of an agreement as opposed to the formalislic approach often followed 
by the Commission in Illany of its decisions. !d.; see also Langnese, 199:' E.C.R. II-1533; Case 
T- 9/93, Scholler Lebensmitlel v. Commission, 1995 E.CR. II-Hill. In Lagllese and Srholln; 
two ice-<Team manufacturers operated in Ihe German market through a subslantialllllm-
bel' of exclush-e plllThase agreements concluded with their retail outlets. The Commission 
denied an individual exemption for the agreements on the grounds thaI, given the sub-
stantial percentage of the market controlled by Lagnese and Scholler through their tied out-
lets and the length of the exclusive purchase obligations imposed upon retailers, the 
agreements had the effect of foreclosing a third competitor, Mars, from access to the Ger-
man market of "impulse" ice-creams. Both pl'oducers appealed the Commission's decisions 
before the C.F.I. The C.F.1. upheld the position of the Commission not to grant the ex-
emptions. ''''hat it is interesting is that, unlike the Commission which only began to analyze 
the market under Article 81 (3). the C.F.1. applied Ddillli/is and analyzed Ihe effecl of the 
agreements on the market under Article 81(1). SCI' Lagnese, E.C.R. II-1572-1573", 99-
101. See the latest application of the Dl'limi/is doctrine in Case 214/99, Neste,Judgment of 
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applied a flexible approach in some of its decisions.90 This tension 
between the two Community institutions also is reflected in the field 
of licensing agreements itself. In Nungesser91 (also known as the Maize 
Seed case), the E.CJ. held that a grant of an open exclusive license (a 
license whereby the owner agrees not to grant other licenses in re-
spect to the same territory and not to compete with the licensee in 
the licensed territory)92 was not contrary to Article 81 (1). In this case, 
INRA, a research institute financed by the French Minister of Agricul-
ture, developed a special hybrid maize seed that could be grown in 
the colder climate of Northern Europe. The INRA assigned its plant 
breeders' rights to Nungesser in order to overcome the prohibition 
under German law that prevented the owner of plant breeders' rights 
1. See the latest application of the Delill/itis docu'ine in Case 214/99, Neste, Judgment of 
the E.CJ. of 7 December 2000 (not yet published). 
90 See COllllllission Decision No. 87/17 (EEC) (Pronuptia) confirmed by the E.CJ. in 
Case 161/84, Pronuptia de Paris GmbH v. Pronuptia de Paris Irmgard Schillgalis, 1996 
E.C.R. 353; Commission Decision No. 94/894 (EC), 1994 OJ. (L 354) 66 (Eurotunnel), 
and Commission Decision No. 90/410 (EEC) , 1990 OJ. (L209) 15 (Elopak/Metal Box-
Odin). The decision of the Commission in Elopak/Metal Box-Odin is considered a land-
mark decision in the development of an ancillary restraints doctrine under Article 81 (l). 
It was a sign that the Commission was more willing to treat the restrictive elements of an 
agreement that has, overall, a pro-{'ompetitive aim, as falling outside Article 81 (l). Indeed, 
it was the first case in which the Commission explicitly applied the ancillary restraints doc-
trine in a negative clearance decision to a number of restrictions on the commercial free-
dom of action of the parties to ajoint venture. See Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, Some Reflections 
on the Notion of Ancillmy Restraints l 'nder EC Competition Law, in 1995 FORDHAM CORP. L. 
INST. 325, 345-46 (Barry Hawk ed., 1996). In this case, the Commission held that the 
agreement between Elopak and Metal Box to establish a R&D joint venture (Odin) was not 
contrary to Article 81 (1) because the parent companies were not actual or potential COIll-
petitors. The Commission found that any of the parent companies would have been able 
to undertake the huge investment that the joint venture required. Moreover, the Commis-
sion also declal'ed compatible with Article 81 (1) a number of restrictions ancillary to the 
establishment of Odin, such as the grant of an exclusive license to exploit the parents' 
know-how. The Commission considered this exclusivity necessary to guarantee that each 
parent company would devote its full eflorts to the project. See CHRISTOPHER BELLAMY & 
GRAHAM D. CHILD, COMMON MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION 88 (1993). See also Commis-
sion Decision No. 98/5:H (EC), 1998 OJ. (L 246) I (Van den Bergh Foods) as an example 
that the Commission is moving towards a more economic approach. 
91 Nungesser, 1982 E.C.R. 2015. For a contemporary analysis of Maize Seed, see V. 
Korah, EXc/llsille Licenses of Patent and Plant Breeders' Rights Under EEC Lalli After lHaize Seed, 
ANTITRUST BULL. 699 (1983); Oliver Axster, Restrictive License Agreements Under EEC Law of 
Competition: The ivIaize Seed Case, Bus. LAWYER, 165 (1983); and J.D.C. Turner, Competition 
and the COlllmon Mmket After Maize Seed, 8 EUR. L. REv. 103 (1983). 
92 Nungesset; 1982 E.C.R. 2068, , 53. An open exclusive license also can be defined as a 
license that does not affect the position of third parties such as parallel importers and 
licensees in other territories. fd. at 2069, , 58. In othel' words, it is a license that does not 
confer absolute territorial protection to the licensee. Id. at 2070, , 61. 
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outside Germany from registering those rights in Germany.93 In addi-
tion, INRA granted Nungesser exclusive rights to cultivate and sell in 
the German market four varieties of the hybrid maize seeds devel-
oped by INRA.94 The INRA agreed that it would not grant further li-
censes in the German territory and that it would try to prevent the 
seeds grown in France from being exported to Germany, except to 
Nungesser.95 Eventually, other seed varieties superceded the INRA 
seed, and at least two dealers in Germany imported the improved 
seeds from dealers in France. Nungesser invoked its license rights and 
successfully restrained parallel imports by these two dealers.96 
Following a strict interpretation of the prohibition contained in 
Article 81 (1) , the Commission found that the exclusive license 
agreement infringed the EC Treaty. The E.C]. quashed in part the 
Commission's reasoning and upheld Nungesser's position that the 
Commission had incorrectly taken the view that an exclusive license 
for breeders' rights must, by its very nature, be treated as an agree-
ment prohibited by Article 81 (1) .97 The E.C]. ruled that a total pro-
hibition of every exclusive license, even an open one, prejudices the 
dissemination of knowledge and new technology in the common 
market98 and prejudices competition in the common market between 
the new product and similar existing products.99 The E.C]. reasoned 
that the open exclusive license was not incompatible with Article 
81 (1) because, without such an exclusive license ensuring that other 
licensees would not be appointed for the granted territory, a licensee 
established in another Member State would be deterred from assum-
ing the risk of cultivating and marketing the INRA's new varieties of 
hybrid maize seed.lOO 
The E.C]. 's judgment does not comment on the relevance of 
novelty when assessing the compatibility of an open exclusive license 
with Article 81 (1). Korah has pointed out that novelty was only one of 
the factors that influenced the E.C].'s ruling. Thus, novelty should 
not be viewed as a requirement for an open exclusive license to es-
cape the prohibition of Article 81 (1). Instead, whether the open ex-
93 Id. at 2057, , II. 
94Id. 
95Id. at 2071, , 64. 
96 Nil ngessl'l; 1982 E.C.R. 2070, , 60 . 
. 97 !d. at 20m, , 52-58. 
98 !d. at 2069, , 45. 
99 Id. at 2069, , 57. 
100 !d. at 2069, n 56-57. 
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clusive license is necessary to encourage investment, even if the prod-
uct is not new, is crucial to the E.C.j.101 
The E.CJ. ruled that a license granting absolute territorial pro-
tection to the licensee (most notably prohibiting other licensees from 
importing the maize seeds into Germany, from selling the product to 
parallel importers, and from meeting uncontested demand from the 
protected licensee's territory) remains contrary to Article 81 (1) .102 
Furthermore, the E.CJ. upheld the Commission's decision in part by 
concluding that these types of licenses cannot benefit from Article 
81 (3) because a license granting absolute territorial protection goes 
beyond what is "indispensable" for inducing the dealer to cultivate 
and market the maize seed.103 
In subsequent cases, the E.CJ. has gone so far as to hold that re-
strictions that are ancillary to a license agreement may not violate Ar-
ticle 81 (1) even when they lead to absolute territorial protection. In 
Coditel 11,104 the E.CJ. held that an exclusive copyright license to ex-
hibit films granting absolute territorial protection to the licensee did 
not infringe Article 81 (1). The E.CJ. reasoned that absolute territo-
rial protection was indispensable for the copyright owner and the li-
censee to obtain fair rewards for creating the film.105 The E.CJ., how-
ever, also held that there are specific circumstances when exclusive 
licenses may fall under the prohibition of Article 81 (1), namely, when 
the exercise of the exclusive right creates barriers which are unjustifi-
able in terms of the needs of the cinematographic industry, when 
there is a possibility of charging fees which exceed a fair return on 
investment, and when the period of exclusivity is unreasonable.106 The 
101 Reg. Monograph, slt/Jm note 2, at 88. Not all the authors share this view. Sebastiano 
Gutusso of the EC Commission believes that dissemination of a new technology is an es-
sential factor if an open exclusive lin'nse is to be considered compatible with Article of 
81 (I). See Gutusso, su/minote 14, at 237. 
102 Nungessel', 1982 E.C.R. 2070, , 61. KOl'ah has pointed out that the reasoning of the 
E.CJ. in Nungesser seems to be inconsistent in certain points. In , 53, the E.CJ. seems to 
extend the concept of open exclusive licenses to those clauses which prevent a licensee 
from selling in another territory, whereas' 77 holds that this clause is contrary to Article 
81. According to Korah, the inconsistency and vagueness of the judgment "indicates that 
there must have been profound disagreement between the judges." Reg. Monograph, S/l-
pm note 2, at 49-50. Thereafter, in BOlissois/III telpa lie, [1988] 4 C.M.L.R, , 16a, the Com-
mission helel that a license containing a clause which prevents a licensee from selling in 
another territory does not qualifY as open exclusive license. Introductory Guide, sllpm 
note 8, at 244. 
103 See Nungessel; 1982 E.C.R. 2073-74, 'lI 77. 
104 Case 262/81, Coditel SA et al. v. Cine Vog Films SA and Others. 1982 E.C.R. ~~~~81. 
105 Id.' 16. 
106 See id. " 16, 19. 
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E.CJ. did not elaborate on the circumstances under which an exclu-
sive copyright license still may be contrary to Article 81 (1) and left to 
the national court the task of ascertaining whether the exercise of the 
exclusive right had the objective or effect of restricting competi-
tion. 107 The criteria set out in Coditel II, however, are difficult to apply 
in practice. The E.CJ. entrusted the national court with the difficult 
task of determining whether an absolute territorial protection clause 
gives the licensee the possibility of charging fees exceeding a fair re-
turn on investment. Curiously enough, this activity is of the kind that 
Judge Taft indicated in Addyston Pipe and Steel CO.IOS that a judge 
should avoid. 
In ErauwJacquery,109 the E.C.]. upheld an exclusive license over 
plant breeders' rights granting absolute territorial protection to the 
licensee. In this case, absolute territorial protection was necessary to 
allow the holder of the right to control propagators of the basic seed. 
The E.CJ.'s holding can be reconciled ""ith its Nungesser holding be-
cause, in Nungesser, the absolute territorial protection clause related 
both to basic and certified seeds while, in the ErauwJacquery case, the 
absolute territorial protection clause related to basic seeds. no 
The E.CJ.'s reasoning rests upon the fact that basic seeds need a 
more specialized handling than certified seeds. Basic seeds have been 
produced under the responsibility of the breeder according to ac-
cepted practices for the maintenance of the variety.lll Unlike patents, 
for the rights over basic seeds to remain valid, the variety must remain 
distinct, uniform, stable, and useful. ll2 Therefore, in order to main-
tain the distinct character of the variety and allow the owner to retain 
its intellectual property rights, it is necessary for the owner to control 
the destination and use of the basic seed. ll3 
The foregoing cases shed light on the EC competition law's ap-
proach toward exclusive licenses. As some commentators have 
pointed out, it is not entirely clear to what extent Coditel II and Erauw-
107 fri. 
108 85 F. 271. 
109 Case 27/87, Erallwjacqllery Sprl v. La Hesbignonne Societe Cooperative, 1988 
E.eR.1919. 
110 /d. at 1938-39, 'll 10. 
111 Opinion of Advocate General Mischo in Case 27/87, Erallllljacqllhy, 1988 E.C.R. at 
1928 n.3. 
112 Opinion of A{h'ocate General Rozi's in Case 258/78, NlIlIgeSSl'/; 1982 E.C.R. at 2082-
83. 
113 S!'eErallwjacqllery, 1988 E.C.R. at 1938-:~9. 'll'll10-11; Case 27/87. Opinion of Advo-
cate General Mischo, 1988 E.eR. 1927, 'll'll 11-12. 
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Jacquery apply to technology licensing generally.114 The language of 
the E.C]. in Coditel II and Erauw-Jacquery appears to be limited to per-
forming rights and plant breeders' rights respectively. Unlike 
Nungesser, Erauw-Jacquhy specifically referred to rights over basic seeds 
and not to exclusive licenses ill general. Thus, it is difficult to extend 
Erauw-Jacquery to other exclusive licenses, a position also adopted by 
the Commission in its traditionally restrictive interpretation of the 
above-mentioned E.C] rulings. ll5 
A broad interpretation of Coditel II and especially of Erauw-
Jacquery (that an exclusive license granting absolute territorial protec-
tion to the licensee is not contrary to Article 81 (1) whenever it is nec-
essary to market products which need careful handling) would allow 
one to argue that a pure exclusive software license, which is not cov-
ered by any of the block exemptions,116 escapes the prohibition of Ar-
ticle 81 (l) .117 Nevertheless, the Commission includes pure exclusive 
software licenses in the prohibition of Article 81 (l) .118 
The Commission also has narrowly interpreted the E.C]. 's hold-
ing in Nungesser. Unlike the E.C]., the Commission presupposes that 
an open exclusive license is prohibited under Article 81 (l) .119 Fur-
thennore, despite Nungesser's reference to exclusive licenses in gen-
eral, the Commission has limited Nungesser's ruling to plant breeders' 
rights.120 The Commission never has employed the Nungesser holding 
1\4 See Reg. l\lonograph, sujJra note 2, at 50. 
115 Id. at 50. See, however, Article 2(3) of Commission Regulation (EC) No. 2790/99 
on the Application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and 
Concerted Practices, OJ. [1999] L 336/21. Article 2(3) states that Regulation 2790/99 
applies to vertical agreements containing intellectual property provisions provided that 
those provisions do not constitute the "primary object" of the vertical agreement and are 
directly related to the use, sale, or resale of goods or sel'vices. Article 2(3) could be ex-
tended to exempt exclusive software licenses by arguing that the "primary object" of the 
license is the dissemination of the software rather than the license as such. This approach, 
however, is risky since, to date, Article 2(:~) and its application to exclusive software li-
censes has not been subject to the analysis of EC COlIlmunity Courts. See Valentine Korah, 
The New EC Vertical Restraint Block Exelllption, 8th Annual Conference on International Intel-
lectual Property Law ami Policy, F onlha1l1 University School of Law, Apr. 28, 2000, at 6 (on 
file with author). 
116 Maurits Dolmans, Software Licensing in Europe-Do "\'11 Need a Block Exelllption?, in 1 
1996 INT'L INTELL. PROP. LAW & POL'y 409 (Hugh C. Hansen cd., 1998). 
117 Introductory Guide, supra note 8, at 246. 
118 V. Korah, Technology Transfer Regulatioll, ill 3 1996 INT'L INTELL. PROP. LAW & POL'y 
46-1,46-2 n.7 (Hugh C. Hansen cd., 1998). 
119 See Introductory Guide, sllpm note 8, at 240--11; Reg. Monograph, S/ljna note 2, at 
49, 56-71, 1'~8-39. 
120 Korah opines that the E.CJ, did not want to limit the scope of its holding to plant 
breeders' rights. Instead, the judgment has to be interpreted as applicable to all those 
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to declare that open exclusive licenses are compatible with Article 
81 (l) because the Commission systematically has argued that the 
product in question is not sufficiently new121 and, indeed, in its deci-
sion in Nungesser, the Commission held that the INRA's varieties of 
maize seed were not new products.122 
The reasoning of the E.C]. in the above-mentioned cases cannot 
qualify as a Rule of Reason analysis. 123 The E.C]. does not weigh the 
pro-competitive effects of the claimed restrictions against their anti-
cOlllpetith'e effects (for example, there is no inquiry into market 
power) as do the U.S. agencies and courts under the Rule of Rea-
son.124 Rather, the E.C]. applies the "ancillary restraints doctrine" to 
inquire whether the challenged restrictions are "necessary" to secure 
the implementation of a lawful agreement.l 25 Under a pure Rule of 
Reason approach, a restraint is justified once its pro-competitive ef-
fects outweigh its anti-competitive effects and, although the necessary 
or indispensable character of a restriction may be a factor to take into 
account, it is not crucial to the decision of whether a particular re-
straint escapes the prohibition of Section 1 of the Shennan Act. 
II. REGULATION OF EXCLUSIVE LICENSES IN THE E.U. TECHNOLOGY 
TRANSFER REGULATION AND THE U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
GUIDELINES 
The purpose of an intellectual property license is to allow third 
parties to use the technology of the licensor. The licensee may require 
the inclusion in the license agreement of an exclusive clause guaran-
teeing the licensee a certain degree of territorial protection. Without 
this protection, the licensee may not be willing to incur the costs re-
quired to set up a line of production and develop a market. 
A licensee may enjoy different levels of territorial protection de-
pending on the scope of the exclusive license as well as on other fac-
tors, such as transport costs or regulatory barriers. The licensor, for 
instance, may grant an open exclusive license. Licensees, however, 
often seek closed exclusive licenses that provide absolute territorial 
protection. In a closed exclusive license, the licensor agrees not to 
situations where open exclusivity is necessary to induce useful investment. See Reg. Mono-
graph, supra lIote 2, at 48-49. 
121 Korah. SIIjlra note 118. at 46-2. n.4. 
122 NUllgessn; 1982 E.C.R. at 2071-72. 'll 68. 
123 Korah. wjlla note 31. at 398; see also Peeters. sIIjJl"G lIote 34. at 5:,G. 560. 
124 Korah. SUjlla note 31, at 398. 
125M. 
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compete in the licensee's territory and agrees to prevent other licen-
sees from pursuing an active or a passive sales policy in the licensee's 
territory. 126 
A. Regulation of Exclusive Licenses in the Technology Transfer Regulation 
1. Agreements Covered by the Regulation 
Article 1 (1) of the Regulation exempts from the application of 
Article 81 (1) pure patent licensing agreements, pure know-how li-
censing agreements, mixed patent and know-how agreements, and 
those agreements containing ancillary provisions relating to intellec-
tual property rights other than patents. These agreements are defined 
in Recitals 4 to 10 and by the first four items of Article 10 of the Regu-
lation. Ancillary provisions are defined in Article 10 (15) . 
Article 5 provides that the Regulation does not apply to technol-
ogy pools, licenses between competitors that hold interests in a joint 
venture, or a license by one competitor to the joint venture if the li-
cense relates to the activities of the joint venture,127 or to reciprocal 
rights between competitors under which there are territorial restric-
tions. Recital 8 excludes from the Regulation agreements relating to 
marketing know-how communicated in the context of franchising 
agreements. Franchising agreements, however, may be exempted un-
der Regulation 2790/99,128 though it is unclear whether the Regula-
tion covers industrial franchising. 129 This issue is relevant because 
126 Under the Technology Transfer Regulation, prohibition of passive sales is permit-
led for a period of five years. Commission Regulation 240/96, arts. 1 (1) (6) and 1 (2) (3J, 
1996 OJ. (L31) 2. 
127 See, however, Article 5(2) which provides that the Regulation applies to agreements 
between a parent company and the joint venture that relate to the activities of the joint 
ventllre if certain thresholds are not exceeded. The licensed products must not exceed 
20% or 10% of the market for the licensed products depending on whethel' the license 
covers production, 01' distribution and production respectively. 
128 Commission Regulation (£C) No. 2790/99 on the Application of Article 81 (3) of 
the Treaty to Categories of Vertical Agreements and Concerted Practices, 1999 OJ. (L 
,~36) 21. The Commission's view is that Regulation 2790/99 only applies to franchising 
and not to industirial franchising. See Commission Notice, Guidelines on Vertical Re-
straints, 2000 OJ (C 291/1) n 42-44. 
129 Industrial Franchising describes an agreement whereby the franchisor communi-
cates to the franchisee instructions on how to produce something (know-how) and licenses 
to it a trademark. Unlike a pure franchising agreement, in an industrial franchising 
agreement intellectual property rights are related to production rather than to marketing 
products or services. 
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there is no group exemption available for industrial franchising un-
less the Technology Transfer Regulation applies. 
The former know-how block exemption regulation applied to 
agreements combining know-how and trademark licenses where the 
trademark license was ancillary to the know-how.130 The Commission 
appears to have interpreted this provision narrowly. In Moose-
head/Whitebread,l3l Moosehead granted to vVhitebread an exclusive 
license to brew and sell beer within the United Kingdom under 
Moosehead's trademarks.132 Moosehead agreed to provide White-
bread with the yeast and with all the relevant know-how necessary to 
produce the product.133 The Commission found that the know-how 
regulation then in force did not apply to Moosehead's industrial fran-
chising because the licensed trademark could not be considered an-
cillary to the know-how.134 The Commission concluded that, although 
the trademark was not very well-known in the United Kingdom,135 the 
parties viewed the Canadian origin of the mark as crucial to the suc-
cess of the marketing campaign, which promoted the product as Ca-
nadian beer.136 
It is unclear whether the Commission would decide a case like 
Moosehead/Whitebread in the same way under the Technology Transfer 
Regulation. The Regulation may be subject to two conflicting inter-
pretations regarding whether it applies to industrial franchising be-
cause of the lack of clarity of the wording of the two provisions under 
which industrial franchising could be evaluated. 
In Recital 6 of the Regulation, the Commission declares that "it is 
appropriate to extend the Regulation to pure or mixed agreements 
containing the licensing of intellectual property rights other than 
patents (in particular, trademarks, design rights, and copyright, espe-
cially software protection), when such additional licensing contributes to 
the achievement oj the objects oj the licensed technology and contains only an-
cillary provisions." (Emphasis added). Recital 6 seems to incorporate in 
the Regulation the traditional notion of ancillary restraints which 
130 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 556/89 on tlit' Application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing agreements, 1989 OJ. (L 61) 1 as 
amendf'd by Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 151/93, 1993 OJ. (L 2) 18. 
131 Commission Regulation No. 90/1986/EEC, 4 C.M.L.R. 391 (1991). 
132 [d. at 394-95, n 7-8. 
133 [d. at 395, ~ 9. 
134 [d. at 398, ~ 15(3). 
135 See id. at 399,1: 15(4) (b). 
136 [d. at 399, ~ 16. The Commission, howen'r, exempted the agreements notified by 
Moosehead and Whitebread pursuant to Article 81 (3). 
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stresses the idea that ancillarity implies that the additional licensed 
technology must be of a lesser value than the licensed know-how or 
patent to which it is ancillary. 
In contrast with Recital 6 and unlike the former know-how block 
exemption regulation, the Technology Transfer Regulation contains a 
broad, and also unusual, definition of "ancillary provisions. "137 Article 
10(15) defines ancillary provisions as those "relating to the exploita-
tion of intellectual property rights other than patents, which contain 
no obligations restrictive of competition other than those also at-
tached to the licensed know-how or patents and exempted under this 
Regulation." This definition does not require that the provisions re-
lated to other kinds of intellectual property be of a lesser value than 
the licensed know-how or patent.138 
Article 10(15) also is subject to two interpretations. Some authors 
argue that, in order to be ancillary under the Regulation, the alleged 
ancillary intellectual property rights must be "ancillary in the usual 
sense" of being less valuable than the licensed know-how or patent 
technology,139 According to this school of thought, if the Commission 
had intended to extend the Regulation to a license of any intellectual 
property other than patents, provided that it also contained a license 
of know-how or patent, one would have expected the structure and 
content of Article 1 (1) of the Regulation to have been substantially 
different and the Commission's intention to have been more clearly 
articulated in the recitals of the Regulation. l4O Despite the foregoing, 
this school of thought acknowledges that, as Recital 6 refers to the 
scope of the Regulation being extended "when such additionallicens-
ing 'contributes' to the achievement of the objects of the licensed 
technology," there might be more to the Regulation than first 
thought. l4I 
A second school of thought postulates that the broad definition 
of ancillary restraints under Article 10(15) clearly indicates that there 
are officials in the Commission who believe that industrial franchising 
can be brought within the Regulation as long as there is a qualifying 
know-how or a licensed patent. This school of thought attempts to 
overcome the apparent inconsistency between Article 10(15) and Re-
137 Reg. Monograph, supra note 2, at 117-18. 
138 See id. at 118. 
139 Christopher Kerse, Block Exemptions Ullder Article 85(3): The Technology Transfer Regu-
lation-Procedural issues, 6 E.C.L.R. 331,335 (1996). 
140 Id. at 335. 
l4l/d. 
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cital 6 by arguing that Recital 6 merely requires the technology to 
contribute to the object of the licensed technology, and that this re-
quirement is not incompatible with the definition of ancillary provi-
sions under Article lO(15).142 Under this approach, it is easier to con-
clude that the Regulation coyers industrial franchising because, on 
one hand, the trademark must not be less yaluable than the licensed 
technology and, on the other hand, the trademark often contributes 
to achieYing the object of the licensed technology.l43 
There are more arguments in fayor of including industrial fran-
chising in the Regulation than there are arguments against it. First, it 
may be inferred from Article 10(15) 's definition of ancillary provi-
sions that the Commission was willing to introduce a change with re-
spect to the fonner know-how block exemption. Second, Recital 6 in-
troduces a double requirement for a license agreement containing 
ancillary rights other than patents to be included under the Regula-
tion. On one hand, the additional license must contribute to the 
achievement of the object of the licensed technology and, on the 
other, it must contain only ancillary proyisions. This wording implies 
that the contribution to the achievement of the object of the licensed 
technology is a requirement different from the requirement of ancil-
larity. This distinction between "contribution" and "ancillarity" sup-
ports the idea that Recital 6 is not inconsistent with the definition of 
"ancillary proYisions" contained in Article 10(15), which permits in-
dustrial franchising to be covered more easily by the Regulation. 
Despite the foregoing, it is unwise to assume that the Regulation 
now includes industrial franchising. The appropriate practical adYice 
is to notifY the Commission of the industrial franchising and to re-
quest an indiYidual exemption or a comfort letter under Article 
81 (3).144 Yet, it is defensible not to notifY the Commission on the 
142 Reg. Monograph • .IIljna note 2, at 118-19. Also in favor of this second approach are 
Bos & Slotboom, sujJra note 2, at 23. 
143 Korah. supra note 118. at 46-5, 46-6. 
144 Form AlB requests the notifying party to indicate if it is willing to accept a comfort 
letter. A positi\'e answer normally speeds up the process because. unlike a formal decision 
granting an individual exemption. a comfort letter does not require the approval of the 
"college" of Commissioners. However, a comfort letter technically is not hinding either 
upon the Commission or the national courts and authorities. OIl the problems which arise 
from comfort letters, s('r C.S. KERsE, E.C. ANTITRUST PROC., 275-76 (1998); Introductory 
Guide. supra note 8. at 147--48. 
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grounds that there are provisions within the Regulation that support 
the argument that industrial franchising is automatically exempt.145 
2. Only Agreements With Two Parties Are Covered 
The Technology Transfer Regulation applies to licensing agree-
ments to which there are only two parties.146 Organizations that con-
stitute a single economic unit are regarded as one undertaking for 
these purposes.147 
In Centrajarm v. Sterling Drug, the E.C] held that an agreement 
between parties belonging to the same group and having the status of 
parent and subsidiary was not caught by Article 81 (1) if the parties 
form an economic unit within which the subsidiary does not have real 
freedom to determine its conduct and "if the agreements or practices 
are concerned merely with the internal allocation of tasks as between 
[parties]. "148 In Viho Europe, the E.C]. qualified the Centrafarm test 
and held that Article 81 (1) does not apply to agreements within the 
corporate group when a subsidiary does not freely determine its con-
duct in the market, whether or not the parties to the agreement allo-
cate tasks between the different subsidiaries.149 
Article 6(3) of the Regulation also provides that agreements 
where some of the rights or obligations are assumed by individuals or 
entities connected with the parties to the agreement also fall within 
the scope of the block exemption.150 Thus, for the purposes of the 
Regulation, connected parties are considered one party. 
3. Extraterritorial Application 
The Technology Transfer Regulation applies to territorial restric-
tions that extend beyond the territory of the common market.15l Ter-
ritorial restrictions outside the common market can affect competi-
115 See V. Korah, Panel Discussion: The Technology Transfer Regulation in 3 1996 INT'L IN-
TELL. PROP. LAW & POL'y 47-1 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1998). 
116 Commission Regulation (CE) No. 240/96 of 31 of]anuary 1996 on the Application 
of Art. 85 (3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer Agreements, 1996 
OJ. (L 31) 2, at art. 1(1). 
117 Case 170/83, Hydroterm Geratebau GmbH v. Compact del Dott. Ing. Mario An-
dreoli & C Sas, 1984 E.C.R. 2999. 
118 Centrafann, 1974 E.C.R. 1147" 16 (Ruling). 
119 Case C-73/95, Viho Europe BV v. Commission, 1996 E.C.R. 1-5457" 16. 
150 "Connected undertakings" are defined in Article 10(14) of Commission Regulation 
240/96. 
151 Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital 7,1996 OJ. (L 31) 2. 
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tion within the common market and do so, for instance, when im-
ports into the common market are subject to restrictions imposed on 
external territories, or when a licensee in the common market is re-
stricted from operating outside the common market.152 It is unclear, 
however, whether the Regulation automatically exempts agreements 
for territories wholly outside the common market. The Regulation 
may be interpreted in either of two ways. 
First, it is arguable that, because Articles I (1) (1) and I (1) (2) of 
the Regulation refer to the "licensed territory," a concept defined in 
Article 10 (II) as a "territory covering all or at least part of the com-
mon market," the Regulation does not apply to agreements covering 
territories wholly outside the common market. 153 Under this ap-
proach, if there is a risk that these agreements infringe upon Article 
81 (I) then individual notification is required. 
The opposite position may also be sustained because Recital 7 of 
the Regulation does not require that the licensee cover at least part of 
the common market before the Regulation applies. 154 Moreover, the 
first paragraph of Article 1(1) does not require license agreements to 
cover at least part of the common market to exempt the territorial 
restrictions contained therein. Accordingly, it can be argued that, if 
the Commission had wanted to establish this important limitation to 
the territorial scope of the Regulation, it would have mentioned it 
expressly in the first paragraph of Article I (I). 
152 Kevin Coates & John Finnegan, IlItellerill({1 Proj}{'/'ty, in THE EC LAW OF COMPETI-
TION, 600-01 (jonathon Faull & Ali Nikpay eds., 1999). See Case C-:~OG/96,Javico Interna-
tional andJavico v. Yves Saint Laurent Parfunns, 1998 E.C.R. I-198,~, 'll 38. In this case, the 
E.CJ. held that Article 81 (1) precluded a supplier established in one Member State from 
imposing on a distributor established in another Member State to which the supplier en-
trusted the distribution of his products in a tenitorv outside the EC a prohibition on mak-
ing any sales outside the third country in question. including the EC, either by direct mar-
keting or re-exponation from the contractual tenitory, if that prohibition had the effect of 
preventing, restricting. or distOl,ting competition within the EC. This "might" be the case 
where the EC market in the products in question is characterized Iw an oligopolistic stnIC-
ture or by an appreciable difference between the prices cha1'ged for the contractual prod-
uct within the common market and those charged outside the EC and where, in view of 
the supplier's market position for production and sales in tllP EC. the prohibition entails a 
risk that it "might" have an appreciable effect on the pattern of trade between Member 
States as to undermine the attainment of the ohjectives of the common market. 
153 Coates & Finnegan, sllj)l"({ note 152. at 601. 
154 Recital 7 prm'ides, "[wJhere licensing agreements for non-member countries or for 
territories which extend beyond the frontiers of the Community have effects within the 
common market which may fall within the scope of Article 81 (l), such agreements should 
be covered by this Regulation to the same extent as would agreements for territories 
within the common market." See Commission Reglllation, sujJ/,({ note 151. 
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According to some Commission officials, the Commission's posi-
tion as to the application of the Regulation to license agreements 
wholly outside the common market is "unclear. "155 Thus, there may be 
a contradiction between Recital 7 and the fact that the Regulation's 
definition of "licensed territory" requires that at least part of the 
common market be covered by the license. The approach that relies 
on Recital 7 is stronger than the approach that relies on the fact that 
the Regulation's definition of "licensed territory" requires at least part 
of the common market to be covered by the licensee. First, Recital 7 is 
the provision in the Regulation which deals specifically with the extra-
territorial application of the Regulation, and its wording allows the 
application of the Regulation to agreements for territories wholly out-
side the common market. Thus, Articles 1 (1) (1) and 1 (1) (2) should 
be read in light of Recital 7. Second, there exists no policy reason jus-
tifying the exclusion of license agreements from the scope of the 
Regulation solely on the grounds that those agreements do not cover 
at least part of the common market. If the prohibition of Article 81 (1) 
applies to agreements, including license agreements, for territories 
wholly outside the common market that are implemented within the 
common market,156 there is no reason why these agreements should 
not benefit from the block exemption to the same extent as do 
agreements for territories within the common market. 
4. Territorial Restrictions 
a. Open Exclusive Licenses 
i. Exempted Provisions 
The Technology Transfer Regulation exempts agreements 
whereby the licensor agrees not to license anyone else in the licen-
see's territory (Article 1 (1) (1)) and not to exploit the technology in 
the licensed territory himself (Article 1 (1) (2)). The Regulation also 
exempts a restriction imposed upon the licensee not to exploit the 
technology in the licensor's territory (Article 1(1)(3)). In addition, a 
licensee may agree not to exploit the licensed technology in the terri-
tories of the common market that are licensed to other licensees (Ar-
ticle 1 (l)( 4)). The Regulation exempts a restriction preventing a li-
155 Coates & Finnegan, .Ill/1m note 152, at GOO. 
156 Joined Cases, 89, 114, 11 G, 117 and 125-129/8:i, Ahlstrl)lll Osakedltio and others \'. 
Commission (Woodpllip 1),1988 E.C.R. :i19,~, ~ IG. 
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censee from engaging in an active sales policy, in particular from ad-
vertising, in the territory of other licensees, and also exempts a pro-
hibition on passive sales157 in other licensed territories for five years 
from the date the product is first placed in the common market by 
any licensee.158 
According to the E.CJ. 's ruling in Nungessn; the obligations ex-
empted under Articles 1 (1) (1) and 1 (1) (2) amount to open exclusiv-
ity and may be compatible with Article 81 (1). However, the obliga-
tions imposed on the licensee, that are exempted under Articles 
1(1) (3), (4), (5), and (6), allow greater territorial protection than the 
E.CJ. Nungesser holding indicated may be compatible with Article 
81 (1). The obligations exempted in Articles 1 (1)( 3), (4), (5), and (6) 
go beyond those imposed on the licensee and licensor by an open 
exclusive license because they have the effect of conferring absolute 
territorial protection between licensor and licensee and between the 
licensees.159 
Because Article 1 (1) of the Technology Transfer Regulation ex-
empts pure patent licenses, pure know-how licenses, and mixed li-
censes, including those licenses containing ancillary provisions relat-
ing to intellectual property rights other than patents, from the 
prohibition of Article 81 (1), the exemption also covers open exclusive 
licenses. Thus, contrary to the E.CJ. 's ruling in Nungesser, the COIlllUis-
sion presupposes that an open exclusive license may infringe Article 
81 (1) and, therefore, that the license needs to be exempted.160 
Article 1 (1) of the Technology Transfer Regulation must be in-
terpreted in conjunction with Recital 9. Recital 9 declares that open 
exclusive licensing agreements "may not be in themselves" incompati-
157 Passive sales are those made in the territories licensed to other licensees within the 
common market in response to unsolicited orders. Commission Regulation 240/9G, art. 
1 (l) (G). 
158 Commission Regulation 240/9G, arts. 1 (1) (5), 1 (1 ) (6), 199G OJ. (L 31) 2. 
159 It must be noted, however, that although officials of the Commission refer to "abso-
lute territorial protection" as hetween licensor and licensee, in fact, this protection is al-
ways limited. Under the rules of free movement of goods and, more specifically under the 
doctrine of exhallStion as developed by the E.CJ., those to whom either party sells the 
protected product cannot be restrained through the exelTise of national intellectual prop-
erty rights from selling it throughout the common market. SI'I' Introductory Guide, slljJl'U 
note 8, at 249. 
1f>O The E.CJ. in ftal), v. COllllcil and C01l/1IIissioll held thaI an agreement that falls "'ithin 
an exempted category docs not necessarily fall wilhin the prohibition of Article 81 (1). 
Case 32/G5, 19GG E.C.R. 389, 406. According to the F..Cj., granting exemptions by catego-
ries cannot amount, even by implication, to passing a pre-conceived judgment on any 
agreemen t considered individually. !d. 
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ble with Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty "where they are concerned 
with the introduction and protection of a new technology in the li-
censed technology, by reason of the scale of the research which has 
been undertaken, of the increase in the level of competition, in par-
ticular interbrand competition, and of the competitiveness of the un-
dertakings concerned resulting from the dissemination of innovation 
within the Community." 
Recital 9 shows that the Commission has narrowly interpreted 
Nungesser because it makes the exclusion of an open exclusive licens-
ing agreement from the prohibition of Article 81(1) dependent on 
the introduction of a new technology. Recital 9 is not satisfactory be-
cause it introduces legal uncertainty as to when an open exclusive li-
cense falls outside the prohibition of Article 81 (1). For instance, how 
new must this technology be in order for the license agreement to be 
covered under the Regulation?161 Note in particular that the Commis-
sion never has considered a product sufficiently new for the purpose 
of qualifying a license agreement as granting an open exclusive li-
cense.162 
The Commission missed an opportunity to enhance legal cer-
tainty in this area by endorsing, without qualification, the ruling of 
the E.CJ. in Nungesser. Contrary to Recital 9's suggestion, the E.CJ. 
did not condition such exclusion on novelty. Novelty was only men-
tioned as one of the elements to be taken into account when deciding 
if an open exclusive license is contrary to Article 81 (1). Indeed, the 
need to encourage investment is the most important factor in the 
E.CJ.'s reasoning.163 
11. Duration of the Exemption 
a. basic provisions 
Articles 1 (2), 1 (3), and 1 (4) of the Regulation impose time limi-
tations on the grant of exemptions depending on whether the license 
is a pure patent license, a pure know-how license, or a mixed license. 
For pure patent licenses, Articles 1(1)(1) to 1(1)(5) apply to the ex-
tent that and for as long as the licensed product is protected by paral-
161 Davis & Johnston, supra note 85, at 19. 
162 Reg. Monograph, supra note 2, at 141. 
163 Id. at 88. 
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leI patentsI64 in both the territory of the licensees and the territory of 
the licensor.165 For a pure know-how license, in contrast, the exemp-
tion period is limited to ten years from the date when the licensed 
product is first placed in the common market by one of the licen-
sees. I66 
For a mixed license, the duration of the exemption also is limited 
to ten years from the date when any of the licensees first places the 
licensed product in the common market. Potentially, however, the 
longer period available to pure patent licenses may be available to 
mixed licenses if there is a "necessary patent" both in the licensed ter-
ritory and in the territory protected by a restriction on exploitation of 
the licensed technology outside the licensed territory.I67 The re-
quirement of necessity prevents application of the longer period to a 
Know-how license where an irrelevant patent was added. I6s 
Finally, a prohibition on passive sales between licensees is limited 
to five years from the date the licensed product was placed in the 
common market by any of the licensees, whether the licenses is a pure 
patent, a pure know-how, or a mixed license. 
b. different levels oj territorial protection granted to licensors and licensees 
Licensees are not given the same level of territorial protection 
vis-a-vis each other with respect to passive sales as is permitted be-
tween licensor and licensee. The licensor may rely on his contractual 
rights against passive sales by any of its licensees in its territory for the 
duration of the patent license, or for ten years from the date of the 
first sale by any licensee in the common market for a know-how li-
cense. The licensee can rely only on its licensed rights against passive 
sales from other licensees into its territory. In addition to its contrac-
tual rights, the licensor also may rely on its patent rights to prevent 
164 Article 10(13) of the Technology Transfer Regulation defines parallel patents as 
"patents which, in spite of the divergences which remain in the absence of any unification 
of national rules concerning industrial property, pmtect the same inyention in various 
Member States." 
165 Commission Regulation 240/96, art. 1 (2) 1996 OJ. (L 31) 2. 
166 [d. art. 1 (3). 
167 [d. an .. 1 (4). Necessary patents are "patents where a license under the patent is 
necessary for the putting into effect of the licensed technology in so far as, in the absence 
of such a license, the realization of the licensed technology would not be possible or would 
be possible only to a lesser extent or in more difficult OJ" costly conditions. Such patents 
must therefore be of technical, legal or economic interest to the licensee." Commission 
Regulation 240/96, art. 10(5), 1996 OJ. (L 31) 2. 
168 Reg. Monograph, SlljJ1¥l note 2, at 152. 
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any of its licensees from making direct sales in its territory or the ter-
ritory of any of the other licensees (Article 2(1) (14) ).169 
The relationship between Article 1 (2) and Article 2(1) (14) .re-
quires clarification. Article 1 (2) imposes a five-year limitation on pas-
sive sales outside the licensee's territory while Article 2(1) (14) never-
theless allows the patent licensor to prevent passive sales after five 
years. The explanation for the apparent contradiction is that Article 
1 (2) addresses the contract between licensor and licensee, while Arti-
cle 2(1) (14) addresses the licensor's patent rights. 
For the first five years, the licensor has a choice between two 
causes of action that can prevent direct sales by a licensee outside the 
licensee's territory: one based on contractual provisions (Article 1 (2)) 
and another based on patent rights (Article 2(10)(14)). Mter five 
years, contractual bans on direct passive sales are unenforceable and 
the licensor's only recourse is patent litigation in the country of im-
portation.170 Contractual rights are significantly easier to enforce be-
cause there is no need to prove the ownership, existence, and validity 
of the patent. l7l It is regrettable that the Regulation does not state a 
policy reason justifying the higher level of territorial protection in fa-
vor of licensors. There is, however, a plausible explanation and justifi-
cation for this distinction. The licensee frequently has to make sub-
stantial investments to set up a production line, develop the market 
and, sometimes, to improve the licensed technology. Therefore, the 
licensee needs some degree of territorial protection if it is to be in-
duced to invest. However, the licensor, unlike the licensee, usually 
takes the initiative to engage in costly and risky research and devel-
opment. The Commission seems to have been persuaded by the idea 
that the decision to invest in research and development undertaken 
by the licensor often entails a financial risk additional to that borne by 
the licensee. This risky and costly investment initiative would justify 
granting to the licensors a level of territorial protection higher than 
that granted to licensees. 
169 Commission Regulation 240/96, Recitalll, 1996 OJ. (L 31) 2. 
170 Maurits Dolmans, COlllll1entm:y: TenitOlial Restrictions and the EC Technology Transfer 
Regulation, in 31996 INT'L INTELL. PROP. L'\w & POL'y 48-1, 48-2 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 
1998). 
171 Id. at 48-2. 
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c. technology transfer regulation and regulation 2790/99 distinguished 
The Commission has taken a more flexible approach regarding 
the prohibition of passive sales in licensing agreements than it has 
taken regarding passive sales in vertical distribution agreements. Like 
repealed Regulation 1983/83,172 Regulation 2790/99 does not permit 
restrictions on passive competition.173 The Technology Transfer Regu-
lation does not state the polin' reason for allowing a restriction on 
passi\'e sales on licensees. In my \;ew, the Commission thought that a 
licensee desenes more protection during the start-up period than a 
COUlmon distributor, since a licensee frequently has not only to de-
velop a market within the licensed territory, but also to invest in set-
ting up a production line and, possibly, improving the technology. 
iii. The Application of Regulation to Less Restrictive Clauses: Ob-
ligations Promised by the Licensor 
The Technology Transfer Regulation does not expressly exempt 
an agreement between the licensor and its licensees that the territo-
rial restrictions provided in Articles 1 (l) ( 4), 1 (l) (5), and 1 (1) (6) will 
be imposed on other licensees. Some commentators have argued that, 
since the Commission considers in Recital 12 of the Regulation that 
territorial restraints encourage licensors to grant licenses and licen-
sees to undertake the investments required to implement the li-
cense,174 a promise to impose the permissible restrictions to other li-
censees is exempted as well. 175 
The Regulation also does not explicitly exempt a promise by the 
licensor not to grant additional licenses without the consent of the 
172 Commission Regulation 1983/83 on Application of Article 8[)(3) of the Treaty to 
Categories of Exclush'e Distribution Agreements, 1983 OJ. (L 173) 1. 
173 See Commission Regulation 2790/99, art. 4(b), 1999 OJ (L 336) 21. 
li4 Both the E,U. Tecllllologv Transfer Regulation and the U.S. II' Guidelines share the 
same economic rationale to allow certain restraints in licensing agreelllellls. The Technol-
ogy Transfer Regulation states that technology transfer agreements 
encourage the dissemination of technical knowledge in the Community and 
[1 promote the manubcture of technically more sophisticated products. 
[Therefore], [tlhe obligations listed in Article 1 generally contribute to im-
proving the production of goods and to promoting technical progress. They 
make holders of patents or know-how 1I10re willing to grant licenses and li-
censees more inclined to undertake the im'cstment required to manufacture, 
use, and put on the market a new product or to use a ne\\' process. 
Commission Regulation 240/96, Redtals,~ and 12, 1996 OJ, (L 31) 2. 
175 See \~\N DE WALLE DE GUELCKE & \AN GER"EN, COMPETITION LHr OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY, 9-56 (1996); Reg. Monograph, slIjJra note 2, at 140. 
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majority of licensees. The problem is that such an agreement is likely 
to have a horizontal element and well may be part of a patent or 
know-how pool excluded from the Technology Transfer Regulation by 
Article 5(1) (1) or (3).176 Before the adoption of the Regulation, in 
Bronbemaling v. Heidemaatschappij, the Commission disapproved an 
agreement to settle a patent dispute before the Dutch patent office 
between three competing building companies and a licensor because 
the agreement stated that the licensor would not grant additional li-
censes without the consent of the majority of the building compa-
nies.177 
b. Closed Exclusive Licenses 
Without prejudice to Article 1 (1) (6) (restrictions on passive sales 
for five years), the Technology Transfer Regulation does not exempt 
licenses granting absolute territorial protection between licensees.l78 
Therefore, a license agreement granting absolute territorial protec-
tion to the licensee can escape the prohibition of Article 81 (1) only if 
the parties apply for and obtain an individual exemption pursuant to 
Article 81 (3). Given the strict approach taken by the Commission to-
wards agreements that may have the object or the effect of dividing 
the common market, the Commission is likely to reject such an ex-
emption. 
c. The Loopholes in the Territorial Protection Allowed Under the Regulation 
Even when a licensor grants its licensees some territorial protec-
tion, a licensee is not totally insulated from competition. Where 
transportation costs are not an important element in the final price of 
the licensed product, there are several circumstances that may limit 
the amount of territorial protection granted by the licensor to the li-
176 See Reg. Monograph, sujJranote 2, at 135 n.20. 
J77 Commission Decision, 1975 OJ. (L 249) 27 (Bronbemaling v. Heidemaatschappij). 
See Reg. Monograph, supra note 2, at 100. 135. 
178 Anicle 3 of the Technology Transfer Regulation states that the exemption does not 
apply if the agreement contains provisions preventing parallel imports, i.e., one or both of 
the parties are required without any objectively justitied reason: (a) to refuse to meet orders 
h'om users or resellers in their respective territoI"ies who would market products in other 
territories within the common market; (b) to make it difficult for users or resellers to ob-
tain the products from othtT resellers within the common market and, in particular, to 
exercise intellectual property rights or take measures so as to prevent users or resellers 
from obtaining outside, or from putting on the market in the licensed ten-itory, products 
which have been hmfully placed in the common market by the licensor or with his con-
sent. 
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censee even in those cases in which a licensor grants absolute territo-
rial protection to a licensee. 
First, a licensee may face interbrand competition from licensees 
selling products made by competing technologies. If, for instance, the 
licensees of the competing technologies are not manufacturing the 
competing products in a geographic area close to the first licensee's 
territory, then interbrand competition can be mitigated if transporta-
tion costs are high. Interbrand competition also may be mitigated if 
there are significant regulatory or other barriers between various ter-
ritories. 
Second, the principle of exhaustion of rights as developed by the 
E.CJ. prevents the licensor or the licensee from relying on its intellec-
tual property rights to impede parallel imports of products which 
have been brought into the country of origin by the licensor or by a 
third party with the licensor's consent,179 Although the E.CJ. refers to 
marketing in the country of origin, and not to direct sales by the li-
censee into another Member State, the Commission traditionally had 
interpreted that the grant of a license exhausted the right of the li-
censor in the country of import. 180 However, the Commission 
changed its course in the Technology Transfer Regulation with Article 
2 (1 ) (14) 181 and returned to its view on limited licenses stated in its 
"Christmas Message" of 1962.182 
The Commission's changed approach is difficult to explain, es-
pecially in view of the strong language used in its press release regard-
179 Ce'ntrafarm, 1974 E.C.R. 1147. 
180 In the GEMA case, the' Commission inte'n'e'ne'd to de'te'r the' Ge'rman cop)"ight PI'O-
tection socie'ty from re'questing the' payme'nt of ro\'altie's to the' manufacturers of sound 
recordings in Germany working to order a11d on accoun t of sound re'cording suppliers 
licensed by 011e of the copyright pl'Otcction socictks of the' various Me'mber States. Accord-
ing to the Commission's Press Release' announcing the settkme'11t of the case, a license' 
granted by a Community copyright pl'Ote'ction socie'ty is valid thl'Oughout the Community 
and authorizes manufacture in any Member State. In other words. for the Commission the 
grant of a lice'nse exhausted the cop'~'ight right of the licensor i11 the country of import. 
Sl'eCommission's Press Releasc, Feh1'llary 6, 1985, r19851 2 eM.L.R. 1, 1. 
181 Enrique Gonzalez Diaz, Comments oj thl' Draft EC Blor/{ E.Wllljltioll. ill 2 INT'L INTELL. 
PROP. LAW & POL'y 34-1, 34-1, 34-2 (Hugh C. Hansen ed., 1998); Intl'Oductory Guide, 
sujHa note 8, at 241. 
182 Sl'l'Notice on Patent Liccnsing Agreements, 2922/62, 1962 OJ. (commonly known 
as the "Christmas Message," partly because of its date and partly because of the good news 
that many exclusive licenses would not inf)-inge Article 81 (1) and need not be bl'Ought to 
the "attention of the Commission); se!' alw Reg. Monograph, slljlra note 2, at 72-73 n.4G. 
Notice that in none of its formal decisions on patcnt licenses did the Commission accept 
the view announced in its "Christmas Message." Reg. Monograph, slljna note 2, at 72-73. 
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ing the settlement of proceedings against GEMA,l83 The Commission 
may have decided to include Article 2(1) (14) in the Regulation in 
order to strengthen the defense of its position in the Ladbroke case, At 
the time the Technology Transfer Regulation was being drafted, the 
Legal Service of the Commission was defending the Commission's 
rejection of a complaint submitted to it by a Belgium betting agency 
(Tierce Ladbroke) against the grant of an exclusive license in the 
films of French horse-races limited to Germany and Austria,l84 
Contrary to its position in the GElWA case,185 the Commission re-
jected the complaint by Tierce Ladbroke because the challenged re-
strictions formed part of the inherent right granted to a copyright 
holder to choose its licensees and the size of the territories that it 
grants to them; therefore, the restrictions did not infringe Article 
81 (l) ,186 
183 "[1] The Commission took the view in this case that, within the Community, free-
dom to choose where to manufacture records and other sound reconJings (pre-recorded 
cassettes, tapes and compact discs) should not be restricted by the application of national 
copyrights laws. [ ... 1 [3J A separate requirement to pay royalties to the national copy-
right protection society having 'jurisdiction' oyer the place of manufacture according to 
the rates applicable there would in practice mean the re-erection of national barriers by 
conll'actual means between Member-States. [ ... 1 [9J This action is part of the Commis-
sion's efforts to ensure the complete freedom of competition and eliminate national bar-
riers in this sector." Commission's Press Release, supra note 180, [1985J 2 C.M.L.R. at 2, 3. 
184 This Commission decision rejecting the complaint related to Belgium and was 
never published. The Commission, however, published a decision regarding a similar 
complaint but related to Germany. [1996J 5 C.M.L.R. 320, PMI-DSV. The Belgian com-
plaint related both to a refusal of PMU (Pari Mutuel Urbain) and PMI (Pari Mutuel Inter-
national) to grant the Belgian subsidiary of the Ladbroke Group (Tiel-ct~ Ladbroke) a li-
cense for the Belgian market, and also to a refusal by DSV (Pl'vlI's German licensee) of a 
sub-license also for the Belgian market. The German decision related both to the refusal 
of PMI to grant the German subsidiary of the Ladbroke Group (Ladbroke Deutschland) a 
sub-license for use in the horse races belting market for Germany on the ground that it 
was not allowed by its agreement with PMU, and also to the refusal of DSV to grant a sub-
license for the sallie market also on the ground that it was banned to do so by its agree-
ment with PMI. The Commission's decision related to Belgium was appealed by Ladbroke 
before the C.F.I., and the GF.1. upheld the rejection of the complaint by the Commission. 
Case T-504/93, Tierce Ladbroke v. Commission, 1997 ECR 11-927, 11 146 151, 152, 153. 
The C.F.1. ruled that "the mere fact that the owner of the copyright has granted to a sole 
licensee an exclusive right over the telTitory of a Member State, while prohibiting the 
grant of sub-licenses for a specific period, is not sufficient to justifY a finding that such a 
contract must be regarded, as the purpose, the means or the result of an agreement pro-
hibited by the Treaty." 1 149. See a critical comlllentary on the Ladbroke case in V. Korah, 
The Ladilroke Saga. 3 E.C.L.R. l69 (1998). 
185 Commission's Press Release, sllpra note 180, [1985 J 2 C.l\LL.R. 1. 
186 Ladbroke, 1997 ECR 11-927, 1 34. In its decision related to Germany, the Commis-
sion held that the provision limiting the exclusive operating license to Germany was not 
caught by Article 81. The holders of the copyright to the pictures of French races, the rac-
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Article 2(1) (14) presupposes that direct sales by a patent licensee 
outside its territory do not exhaust the right of the licensor in the 
country of import. The licensor may reserve its right to rely on its 
patent to impede the sale of the patented goods by one licensee di-
rectly in the territory of another or in the licensor's own territory. 
This provision, however, is not likely to significantly increase the pro-
tection of licensees vis-a-vis other licensees. Once a licensee has sold 
the goods to a dealer, the licensor no longer can rely on its patent to 
prevent the imports of the patented product from entering into its 
territory or the other licensees' territories. Goods are likely to be im-
ported if prices in the country of import are higher than those pre-
vailing in the country of export (this is the situation, for instance, with 
regard to the sale of pharmaceutical products within the E.U.)187 Arti-
cle 2 (1) (14), however, may be useful to protect other licensees and 
the licensor itself if the licensees sell the patented products only to 
final customers and not to dealers.18B 
Finally, a further limitation in the licensee's territorial protection 
arises from Commission Regulation 2790/99.189 Regulation 2790/99, 
which is applicable to vertical distribution agreements, does not per-
mit the licensor to protect its licensees from active sales made by dis-
tributors appointed by the licensor in other territories. 190 On this 
point, Regulation 2790/99 is more restrictive than the repealed Regu-
lation 1983/83 on exclusive distribution agreements.191 Article 2(2) of 
Regulation 1983/83 exempted an obligation imposed on the exclu-
sive distributor "to refrain, outside the contract territory and in rela-
tion to the contract goods, from seeking customers, from establishing 
ing associations, were entitled in granting [its subsidiaryJ PMI the right to use slICh pic-
tures and commentaries to require it to seek their approval whenever PMI wished to exer-
cise those dghts abroad. Likewise, the Commission found that an ohligation imposed on 
DSV to refrain from sub-licensing the licensed pictures outside the licensed teHiton' was 
not caught by Article 81 (1) because "it forms part of the rights granted to copyTight hold-
ers under present Community rules." According to the Commission, if such a clause were 
not included, the license would become a European license under which the licensor 
would no longer be fl'ee, in particular, to choose his sub-licensees for the other Member 
States. PMI-DSV [199Gl .5 C.M.L.R. 320, ~~ 11-12. 
187 Concepcion Fernandez Vici{'n, Why Parallel 1111/)01'1,1 of PIWf/II({cl'lllical Products Should 
be Forbidden, 4 E.C.L.R. 219, 222 (1996). 
188 Reg. Monograph, sujJ1'a note 2, at 206. 
189 Commission Regulation No. 2790/99, 1999 OJ. (L :{36) 21. 
190 Id., art. 4(b), 1999 OJ. (L 336) 21. Article 4(b) ~1 excmpts onl\, "the restriction of 
active sales into the exclusiw' teHitol')' or to an exdusi\'t:' customer group reservcd to the 
supplier or allocated hv the supplier to another buyer, ",here sllch a restriction does not 
limit sales hy the cllstomers of the huyer." 
191 198:{OJ. (L 17:{) 1. 
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any branch and from maintaining any distribution depot." Thus, 
Regulation 1983/83 did not limit the exemption, as Regulation 
2790/99 does, to the "buyers" to whom the supplier has allocated the 
territories. Hence, the exemption of Article 2(2) of Regulation 
1983/83 appeared to cover those situations in which a licensor im-
posed on its distributors an obligation not to pursue an active sales 
policy in its licensees' territories. 
The following example shows the inadequacy of the current ter-
ritorial protection provisions under Regulation 2970/99 in addressing 
the needs of licensors. If a licensor wants to establish a network com-
bining exclusive licensees for some territories and exclusive distribu-
tors for others, the amount of protection received by each of them 
may be inappropriate. For instance, imagine that a licensor appoints 
an exclusive distributor for Spain and an exclusive licensee for the 
UK. For the purposes of the Technology Transfer Regulation, the 
Spanish territory is the "licensor's territory" because the licensor has 
reserved Spain as the licensor's territory within the meaning the defi-
nition of Article 10(12) of the Regulation.192 Thus, the licensor's dis-
tributor can be protected from the active and passive sales of the UK 
licensee subject to the time limits under the Regulation. The distribu-
tor then is receiving an amount of protection that may exceed that 
necessary to induce it to market the product. In contrast, the UK li-
censee, who will have to set up a production line and develop a mar-
ket, is granted less protection than the licensor's distributor. The li-
censee probably will not be protected from the active sales of the 
distributor because Regulation 2970/99 does not exempt such a pro-
VISIOn. 
There is no economic rationale justifYing the licensor's inability 
under Regulation 2790/99 to protect its licensees from its distribu-
tors. Instead, there are meritorious economic and policy reasons to 
permit suppliers to protect its licensees against active sales made by 
the licensor's distributors in the licensed territories. 
The competitive benefits of territorial restraints as acknowledged 
in Regulation 2790/99,193 the improvement of economic efficiency 
within the chain of distribution of goods, and in the Technology 
Transfer Regulation, the dissemination of technology and the im-
192 Article 10(12) defines the "territory of the licensor" as the "territories in which the 
licensor has not granted any licenses for patents and/or know-how covered by the licensed 
tet' hnology.·' 
193 COlllmission Regulation No. 2790/99, Recitals 6,7, and 8, 1999 OJ. (L :~36) 21. 
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provement of manufacturing processes,194 also are present for territo-
rial restraints between a licensee and a distributor. A licensee may be 
unwilling to undertake necessary investments if the licensor does not 
assure it a certain level of territorial protection against the sales made 
by the licensor's distributors in the licensed territory. This lack of pro-
tection of the licensee may have a negative impact on the dissemina-
tion of technology and on the improvement of manufacturing proc-
esses, which are the main objectives of the Technology Transfer 
Regulation.195 The current situation raises the question of under 
which circumstances, if any, an agreement between a licensor and a 
licensee whereby the licensee is territorially protected from the licen-
sor's distributors falls outside the scope of Article 81 (1). 
A clause prohibiting the licensor's distributors from making ac-
tive sales in the territory of the licensee could escape the prohibition 
of Article 81 (1) if the clause is interpreted as ancillary to the license 
agreement because ancillary restraints fall outside of Article 81 (1).196 
In the E.U., the term "ancillary restraints" may be used in two situ a-
tions.197 One school of thought reasons that the term describes those 
restraints that are reasonably necessary for the performance of a con-
tract that is not itself anti-competitive. 198 A second school of thought 
reasons that the term is used to describe any restriction in an agree-
ment that it is not appreciable and which, for that reason, falls outside 
of Article 81 (1) .199 This second interpretation is based on the wording 
of Article 81 (1) as it has been interpreted by the E.C]. In Volk v, ver-
vaecke, the E.C]. held that an agreement does not infringe Article 
81 (1) if it does not appreciably restrict competition in the common 
market.20o A clause restricting distributors from making active sales in 
the licensed territories could qualify as an ancillary restraint, whether 
the term "ancillary restraints" is given one meaning or the other. 
Without being able to impose an obligation on its distributors 
not to make active sales in the licensed territories, the licensor may 
not be able to find any licensee to develop the market and set up a 
production line. This negative obligation then could be an ancillary 
194 Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital 12, 1996 OJ. (L 31) 2. 
195 Id., Recital 3, 1996 OJ. (L31) 2. 
196 For a more elaborated analysis on the different schools of thought regarding ancil-
lary restraints see Gonzalez Diaz, sujJFa note 90. 
197 Id. at 327. 
198 Intl'Oductory Guide, supra note 8, at 318-19. 
199 Gonzalez Diaz, supra note 90, at 327-28. 
200 Case 5/69, 1969 E.C.R. 295, 295. 
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restraint within the first use of the term "ancillary restraints" because 
it is a provision "necessary" to make the license agreement viable. It is 
also possible that a clause imposing on distributors the obligation not 
to make active sales in the licensed territories is ancillary because it is 
not likely to have an appreciable effect on competition. 
The above analysis shows that there is an important regulatory 
gap in EC competition law regarding the protection of licensees from 
sales made by the distributors of the licensor. First, it is incompatible 
with Article 81 (1) for a licensor to grant territorial protection to its 
licensees from the active sales made by its distributors in the licensee's 
territories. Second, such a clause is not covered by any block exemp-
tion. Third, it is unlikely that the Commission will grant an individual 
exemption for such a clause under Article 81 (3). Thus, a prompt re-
form of Regulation 2790/99 is needed to fill the existing gap in the 
territorial protection of licensees. 
d. Time Limits Set Forth in the Technology Transfer Regulation: A Critical 
View 
One of the major differences between the regulation of territo-
rial restraints in licensing agreements in the E.U. and U.S. is the time 
limitations of the exemptions for the territorial protection obligations 
referred to in points (1) to (5) of Article 1 (1) of the Technology 
Transfer Regulation. 
One of the consequences and major drawbacks of having a sys-
tem of block exemptions instead of a Rule of Reason approach is that 
block exemptions must be limited in time.201 It is regrettable that the 
Technology Transfer Regulation does not state any convincing justifi-
cation for these time limits. At the risk of oversimplification, these 
time limits appear to be a manifestation of the Commission's tradi-
tional sensitivity to schemes or agreements that have the potential of 
dividing national markets in the E.U. 
i. The Ten Years in Know-how Limitation and Mixed Agreements 
The Commission unconvincingly tries to justifY the ten year time 
limitation with the difficulty in determining the point at which the 
201 Council Regulation 19/65, which empowers the Commission to make regulations 
exempting certain classes of agreements. proyides that block exemptions shall be made for 
a specific period. Art. 2, 1965 OJ. (:~()) 5:r~, ([II/I'I/(/I'd by Council Regulation (Ee) No. 
1215/1999,1999 OJ (148) 1. 
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know-how ceases to be secret. 202 Although it may be difficult to de-
termine the time at which the know-how ceases to be secret, it also is 
arguable that the duration of the territorial restraints in know-how 
agreements should have been determined on the basis of the precari-
ous nature of the know-how's secrecy.203 In other words, the Commis-
sion relies on the difficulty in determining when the know-how ceases 
to be secret without taking into account as much as it should the fact 
that, given the swift development of technological changes, the dura-
tion of the agreement may be foreshadowed when the know-how en-
ters the public domain. 204 The ten year limit seems to be the conse-
quence of a compromise between the seven years suggested by the 
Commission and the recommendation made by the European Par-
liament that it was inappropriate to stipulate a maximum time. 205 
An explanation, but not a justification, for the ten year time limit 
set out by the Regulation may be found in the tension between the ex 
ante and the ex post analysis of licensing agreements which often char-
acterizes the approach of the Commission towards exclusive licenses. 
Behind the ten year limitation, one can see the shadow of an ex post 
analysis of the restrictive clauses that may be included in exclusive li-
cense agreements. In my view, when the Commission decided to in-
troduce the ten year time limit, it had in mind the idea that the licen-
see and the licensor are in a horizontal relationship once the licensee 
begins manufacturing the products under the licensed technology. If 
the Commission considers a license agreement as horizontal, it is eas-
ier to justify more restrictive time limits because then the territorial 
limitations exempted under Article 1 (1) (1) of the Regulation are 
likely to be perceived as a partitioning device to divide the common 
market and, therefore, worthy of being strictly limited in time. 
Should the Commission have had an ex ante approach in mind 
when the introduction of this time limitation was being discussed, it 
probably would have exempted the prohibition of active sales in 
know-how agreements for a longer period. An ex ante analysis of a li-
cense agreement requires the Commission to determine whether a 
licensee would have not entered the market but for the license 
202 Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital n. 1996 OJ. (L:n) 2. 
203 Explanatory Statement to the Motion for a Resolution of the Committee on Eco-
nomic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy, adopted with cle\'cn \'otes in fa\'Ol' and 
one abstention at its meeting of 23-24 March 1988 (rapporteur Mr. Miihlcn). EliI'. ParI. 
Doc A2-36/88 (30 March 1988); [1988] 4 C.I\1.L.R. 653, 660. 
204 ld. at 660. 
205 ]d. 
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agreement. If the answer to this question is affirmative, then the li-
cense agreement should qualify as a vertical arrangement. It is easier 
to justify a longer period for an exemption if the license agreement is 
vertical because pro-competitive efficiencies are more easily attached 
to vertical agreements than to horizontal agreements. A horizontal 
agreement is more likely to cause a reduction of output and an in-
crease in prices than a vertical one. 
The development and subsequent marketing of a product manu-
factured under a know-how technology may be as costly and risky as 
the development and marketing of a product manufactured under a 
patented technology. For this reason, the licensor and licensees 
should be entitled under a know-how license agreement to impose 
upon each other territorial restraints for a longer or unlimited pe-
riod.206 
The ten year time limit may cause a reduction in the value of the 
know-how, thereby discouraging innovation. Under the Technology 
Transfer Regulation, if the parties to a know-how licensing agreement 
believe that a longer period will be necessary to implement their 
agreement, they must apply for an individual exemption under Arti-
cle 81 (3) and must justify the necessity of a longer period on the 
grounds of the expensive and risky investment required under the 
agreement or on the grounds that the parties are not competitors at 
the date ofthe grant ofthe license.207 
In a highly competitive market where innovation evolves rapidly, 
applying for an individual exemption after the expiration of the ten 
year period may damage the competitiveness of a finn in the relevant 
market. This limitation may be especially damaging in sectors where 
research and development are costly and risky and are only under-
taken if parties are able to generate the necessary cash flow during a 
period longer than ten years or even during the period in which the 
know-how remains secret. 
The ten year limit works poorly when technology is being con-
stantly developed. Recital 14 of the Regulation provides that an indi-
vidual exemption under Article 81 (3) is required when the parties 
want to agree on further periods of territorial protection to exploit 
206 Reg. Monograph, supra note 2, at 154. Korah "would have preferred horizontal 
agreements to have been more fully excluded from the regulation and the periods of terri-
torial protection to haye been unlimited [because] [t]he innovator has no incentive to 
share any market power it may have with his licensees and if it restrains them from com-
peting with each other it must be because of the need to induce investments by them." Id. 
207 Commission Regulation 240/96, Recital 14, 1996 OJ. (L 31) 2. 
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any subsequent improvements to the licensed technology. Only when 
the research for improvements results in "innovations" that are dis-
tinct from the licensed technology may the parties enter a new 
agreement benefiting from the exemption under the Regulation. 
The problem with Recital 14 is that it is not easy to distinguish 
"improvements" from "innovations" that are distinct from the licensed 
technology. The prospect of costly and time-consuming litigation, 
which may arise due to conflicting views on the nature of the new in-
ventions may in some situations discourage licensors and licensees 
from committing resources to develop and eventually exploit the im-
provements. 
The ten year period also limits the licensor's know-how rights to 
the period when the time limit starts running on the date the product 
is first placed in the common market by one of the licensees. Thus, 
subsequent licensees are granted territorial protection for shorter pe-
riods. Licensees will not commit to developing a market and setting 
up a line of production if there is not sufficient time left to take ad-
vantage of them, because the cost in building a plant and developing 
a market may be the same as that borne by the previous licensees who 
are enjoying longer periods of territorial protection. The Commission 
never has been persuaded by this argument and has opined that the 
difficulty in persuading subsequent licensees to invest will encourage 
licensors to license more rapidly. 208 
The Commission's view overlooks two main disadvantages. First, 
it discriminates between small and large innovators. A large finn with 
a manufacturing capacity can develop its technology itself and still be 
able to grant protection to each licensee from active sales by the oth-
ers for ten years after the introduction of the licensed product into 
the common market. However, a small finn may have serious prob-
lems in developing its technology and may decide to merge with the 
initial licensee in order to avoid the time limits and the other con-
straints of the Regulation. Second, a licensor lIlay decide to grant the 
first license outside the common market in order to avoid the ten year 
limit. Thus, the current Regulation may, in certain situations, encour-
age development outside the E.U.209 The European industry, as a 
whole, would suffer. 210 
208 See Reg. Monograph, sujJra note 2, at 153; Commission's Press Release, s1ljJra note 
180; IP(84) 270. 
209 See Reg. Monograph, supra note 2, at 154; see al50 Bright, sujJra note 15, at 33-1. 
210 See Bright, s1lpra note 15, at 33-1. 
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Whatever the duration of the time limit for the prohibition of 
active sales in know-how and mixed agreements, the time limit should 
run from the date of its own license so that there will be sufficient 
time left to take advantage of it when the licensee starts to sell. This 
approach was suggested by the Social and Economic Committee in its 
comments on the draft of the previous know-how regulation.211 
ii. The Passive Sales Time Limit 
Protection between licensees from passive sales is permitted un-
der the Technology Transfer Regulation for a period of five years 
from the date the product is first placed in the common market. Like 
the former patent and know-how block exemption regulations, the 
Technology Transfer Regulation does not contain any explanation on 
why the Commission chose this five-year limit. 
During the drafting of the former patent block exemption regu-
lation,212 the Commission initially was opposed to passive sales protec-
tion but seems to have accepted the five-year solution in response to 
the criticism of the Economic and Social Committee. The Commis-
sion, however, did not follow the view of the Economic and Social 
Committee that the protection from passive sales should be as long as 
the protection from active sales.213 
The same argument that justifies a longer exemption for the ac-
tive sales prohibition also is valid with regard to passive sales. The pro-
competitive efficiencies that stem from territorial protection clauses 
inserted in license agreements may justify, at least, an extension of the 
passive sales' prohibition to a period as long as that allowed for active 
sales prohibitions.214 
iii. Conclusion: Proposal for Reform 
Great progress has been made in the achievement of an inte-
grated market in the E.U., and further efforts certainly will be neces-
211 ld. at 153. See Additional Opinion on the Draft Commission Regulation on the Ap-
plication of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing 
Agreements. Economic and Social Committee, adopted at the 25th plenary session on 
23nl March 1988. 1988 OJ. (C 134) 10. 
212 Commission Regulation (EEC) No. 2349/84, on the Application of Article 85(3) of 
the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 1984 OJ. (L 219) 15. 
213 Additional Opinion on the Draft Commission Regulation on the Application of Ar-
ticle 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-how Licensing Agreements, SIt/1ra 
note 211. 
214 Commission Regulation 240/9G, Recital 12, 199G OJ. (L:H) 2. 
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sary if the full economic advantages of integration are to be real-
ized.215 However, I wonder if a stage of maturity already has been 
reached in the creation of the single market in which a thorough 
analysis and debate within the Commission, and between the Com-
mission and the industry, is required regarding whether it is economi-
cally sensible to maintain these time limits. The Technology Transfer 
Regulation seems to be at odds with the vital importance of technol-
ogy to economic growth and to the ability of firms to compete in an 
increasingly globalized market. 
In 1996, the Commission realized that innovation was vital for the 
success of a modern economy and that the two former block exemp-
tion regulations for patent and know-how licenses respectively could 
not properly meet the needs of innovators.216 This was one of the rea-
sons why it adopted the Transfer Technology Regulation as a step to-
wards the creation of a legal environment that would promote techni-
cal innovation and its dissemination within the E.U. In this regard, 
one of the most welcome developments in the Transfer Technology 
Regulation was the adoption by the Commission of a more relaxed 
approach towards certain clauses that were black-listed in the re-
pealed block exemption regulations. 217 
215 Green Paper on Vertical Resu"aints in EC Competition Policy, COl\f(96)721 final, 
Brussels, 22.01.1997, [1997] 4 C.M.L.R. 519,520,1 1. 
216 Jean-Fran(ois Pons, Innovation and Com/letition: A View /roll/ the EUIVpl'a11 Commission, 
at http://europa.eu.int/comm/dg04/speech/seyen/en/sp97067 .htm (Dec. 1, 1997). 
217 The black list of the Technology Transfer Regulation (Article 3) is shorter than 
those of its predecessors. The following obligations on the licensee which were formerly 
contained in the black list of the Patent Regulation and the Know-how regulations were 
excluded from the current black list: (i) an obligation not to contest the secrecy of the 
licensed know-how 01" to challenge the yalidity of licensed patents within the common 
market (a "no-challenge" clause); (ii) a tying clause which is not necessary for a technically 
proper exploitation of the licensed technology or to ensure that the product meets ac-
cepted minimum specifications; (iii) an obligation not to continue to use the licensed 
know-how after the termination of the agl"eement where the know-how has meanwhile 
become publicly known other than by action of the licensee; (iv) an obligation to pay roy-
alties on goods or sen'ices which are not enti\"e!y 01" partially produced by means of the 
licensed technology 01" fOl" the use of know-how which has become publicly known by the 
action of the licensor; (v) an obligation to accept automatic prolongation of the initial 
duration of the licensing agreement by the inclusion in it of any new improvements com-
municated by the licensor; (vi) an obligation to grant the licensor the exclusive right for 
improvements to or new applications of the licensed technology which would prevent the 
licensee during the currency of the licensing agreement and/or thereafter from using his 
own improvements in so far as these are se\'erable from the licensOl"'s own know-how or 
from licensing them to third parties, where such licensing would not disclose the licensor's 
know-how that is still senet (an "exclusiye grant-back clause"); and (vii) customer alloca-
tion restrictions where the parties were not competitors befOl"e the license was granted. 
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As in 1996, the Commission now should be prepared to again 
revise its policy on license agreements and adopt a more lenient ap-
proach towards territorial restraints by amending or repealing the 
time constraints to which territorial clauses in licensing arrangements 
are subject to under the Technology Transfer Regulation. In addition 
to the arguments in favor of this reform that relate to the dissemina-
tion of technology and improvement of manufacturing processes, a 
more specific pro-European economic integration argument also may 
be made in favor of extending or repealing these time limits. The 
more integrated the economies of the Member States become, the 
more damaging the maintenance of a system which may discourage 
the use of innovation and deter licensors from engaging in license 
agreements in different Member States will be. 
Deepening economic integration at the interbrand level eventu-
ally may be prevented or delayed, inter alia, by the time limits estab-
lished under the Technology Transfer Regulation for territorial re-
straints as long as more innovators may be discouraged from investing 
in research and development and eventually licensing its technology 
in different Member States.218 
B. The U.S. Agencies and Courts' Approach Towards Exclusive Licenses 
1. The Application of the Rule of Reason to Territorial Restraints 
The U.S. already had an integrated economy when the Sherman 
Act was enacted in 1890.219 For that reason, market integration has 
not been an objective of U.S. antitrust law.22o Thus, U.S. agencies and 
courts have not been as concerned as the Commission with the anti-
competitive effects of vertical restraints and have judged them, smce 
218 Mastromanolis, SlljJrfl note 21, at G14, This author makes the same criticism with re-
ganl to territorial restrictions in exclush'e distribution agreements. The argument is not 
new, though. In 19GG, Advocate Genel'al Roemel~ in his Opinion in Cases 5G & 58/G4, 
Etablissements Consten SA and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. EEC Commission, 19GG E.C.R. 
352, 359, argued that prohibiting an exclusive distribution agreement which grants abso-
lute territorial protection, Illaking possible imports of the product in question in the terri-
tory of the appointed distributor, may lead to the abolition of the sole distributorship and 
that suppression of the distributor Illay stand in the way of the integl'ation of the various 
national markets. The E.CJ., however, did not follow the Opinion of the Advocate Gen-
eral. 
219 V. KORAH, EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION AND TilE EEC COI\IPETITION RULES 23 (2d ed. 
1992). 
220 Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy, COM(9G) 721 final, 
Bl'lIssels, 22.01.1997, [I99il 4 C.M.L.R. 519, 533. 
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1977, under the Rule of Reason. 221 Despite having an integrated 
economy, before Sylvania (1977) vertical restraints were per se illegal 
under U.S. antitrust law. Nonetheless, license agreements traditionally 
had been subject to a more lenient approach even at the time when 
vertical restraints were considered per se illegal under Schwinn 
(1967).222 
U.S. courts consistently have upheld the validity of territorial re-
strictions in patent license agreements against complaints that an ex-
clusive license agreement is per se illegal because it imposes territorial 
restrictions on licensors and/or licensees.223 Section 261 of the Patent 
Act specifically authorizes the assignment of an exclusive right under 
a patent to the whole or part of the United States.224 One of the aims 
of this provision is to provide the patentee with a reasonable means to 
secure the reward granted to him under the Patent Act. 225 
In view of Section 261, it has not been difficult for U.S. courts to 
rule tllat it not necessary to analyze the reasonableness of territorial 
divisions226 because, as a matter of law, a patent licensor's use of geo-
graphic restrictions in a licensing agreement constitutes a lawful ap-
plication of the rights derived from a patent grant.227 Thus, Section 
261 immunizes an allocation of territories created by a patentee's use 
of exclusive licenses from antitrust liability.228 In this respect, there is 
221 See Paddock v. Chicago Tribune, 103 F.3d 42 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding a series of 
contracts under which various sellers of news and other services supplied one newspaper 
exclusively in a given area). 
222 Schwinn, 388 U.S. at 373. See Dunlop Co. Ltd. v. Kelsey-Hayes Go., 484 F.2d 407, 417 
(6th Cir. 1973). In Dunlop, the court of appeals held that the territorial division of world 
markets thwugh patent licenses did not violate U.S. antitrust law. /d. 
223 Pfizer,lnc. v Heckler, 735 F.2d 1502, 1512 (D.C. Cir 1984); Dunlop Co. Ltd., 484 F.2d 
at 417; U.S. v. Cwwn Zellerbach Corp., 141 F. Supp.118, 127 (N.D. Ill. 1956); Bwwnell v. 
Ketcham Wire & Mfg. Co., 211 F.2d 121, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1954); United States v. Parker-
Rust-PwofCo., 61 F. Supp. 805, 812 (E.D. Mich. 1945). 
224 'The applicant patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner 
grant and convey an exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents, to the 
whole or any specified part of the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 261 (1982). 
225 Crown Zellerbach C01P., 141 F. Supp. at 127. 
226 Some scholars argued that, lacking an expressed exemption, all licensing schemes 
should be subject to a Rule of Reason scrutiny under the antitnlst laws. See Turne1; The 
Patent System and Competitilll' Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. Re\,. 450, 469-70 (1969). 
227 Miller Insituform, Inc., v. Institufol'ln of North America Inc., 605 F. Supp. 1125, 
1130-31 (M.D. Tenn. 1985), afJ'd 830 F.2d 606 (6th Cir. 1987) (the licensees' division of its 
territory among its various sublicensees constituted lawful application of rights del'ived 
fwm the patent grant). See also Selchow & Righter Go. \'. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp.19, 
28-29 (S.D. Fla. 1985) (grant of an exclusive license under design patent of "TI'h'ial Pur-
suit" game-boanl to the whole of the U.S. held not to be an illegal tenitorial restriction). 
228 Dunlop, 484 F.2d at 417; Miller InsitllJonn. 605 F. Supp. at 1131. 
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similarity between the approaches of the U.S. Congress and the 
Commission towards exclusive licenses. 
The Commission considers compatible with Article 81 (1) the 
right to limit the grant of a copyright license to a specific territory on 
the grounds that it forms part of the intellectual property right of the 
holder. In the PNII/DSV case,229 the Commission held that the grant of 
a territorially limited copyright license for performing rights does not 
infringe Article 81 (1). Thus, the holders of a copyright to pictures 
and commentaries of French races were entitled, in granting PMU the 
right to use such pictures and sounds, to require it to seek approval 
whenever PMI wished to exercise those rights abroad. Likewise, the 
Commission held that the grant of a copyright license to DSV by PMI 
limited to Germany, prohibiting DSV from sub-licensing the pictures 
and sounds of the French horse races outside Germany without PMl's 
approval, was part of the rights granted to copyright holders under 
E. U. law. 230 
The introduction of Article 2(1) (14) in the Technology Transfer 
Regulation indicates that the position held by the Commission in the 
Ladbroke decisions with regard to limited exclusive copyright licenses 
over performing rights is applicable also to patent licenses.231 Moreo-
ver, it is arguable that the reasoning of the Commission in PMl/DSV 
also applies to intellectual property rights other than patents and 
copyrights. 232 The PMI/DSV decision, as well as the introduction of 
Article 2(1) (14) in the Technology Transfer Regulation, must be in-
terpreted as a return by the Commission to the narrower definition of 
the exhaustion doctrine given by the E.CJ. in Centrafarm233 and which 
the Commission had interpreted broadly in cases such as GEiVlA.234 
The judgment of the E.CJ. in Centrafarm related to patents, but the 
initial reasoning of the E.CJ. before considering the specific facts of 
the case does not seem to be limited only to patents. Instead, it ap-
pears applicable to all intellectual property rights. 
Given that in the U.S., territorial restrictions in patent licenses 
are considered permissible under Section 261 of the Patent Act, what 
229 PMI-DSV [1996J 5 C.l\I.L.R. ~~20.1I1I 11-12. 
230 The Commission reached the same conclusion in a pre\"ious decision of the "Lad-
broke saga" rejecting a complaint by Tierce Ladbroke (a Belgian betting agellc\") against 
the principal French horse racing associations (Pari Mutuel Urbain and Pari Mllluel In-
ternational). Ladbroke, 1997 ECR II-927, 11 146. 
231 SeeCommissioll Regulation 240/96, Recital 18, 1996 OJ. (L 31) 2. 
232 Korah, slljmlnote 184, at 175. 
23'\ Centrafanll, 1974 E.C.R. 1147, Grounds 11 5. 
234 Commission's Press Release, silpra note 180, [1985] 2 C.M.L.R. 1. 
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is releyant is which restrictions the patentee may impose once its 
rights are exhausted by the first authorized sale. At this point, the pat-
entee's ability to impose territorial restraints would be like that of a 
licensor of other kinds of intellectual property. U.S. courts analyze the 
territorial restraints under the general framework for eyaluating verti-
cal restraints,235 the Rule of Reason.236 Thus, U.S. agencies and courts 
apply a Rule of Reason analysis to all territorial restraints regarding 
intellectual property rights other than patents, for which an equiva-
lent to Section 261 does not exist. 
In the E.U., after the decisions of the Commission on the Lad-
broke complaints and the introduction of Article 2(1) (14) in the 
Technology Transfer Regulation, a patentee or a copyright holder can 
grant an exclusive territory to its licensee. However, unlike in the 
U.S., the territorial restrictions that a licensor imposes on a licensee 
beyond what is entitled under its intellectual property rights are con-
sidered a per se violation of Article 81 (1). Exclusive licenses for intel-
lectual property rights other than copyrights or patents are per se il-
legal pursuant to EC competition law and, therefore, must be 
exempted to be enforceable.237 
For instance, a case like Nungesser would haye been analyzed by 
the U.S. agencies and courts under the Rule of Reason; most likely, 
they would have reached a different conclusion with regard to the ab-
solute territorial protection from that of the E.CJ. A U.S. court would 
have accepted such a clause unless it tended to reduce production 
and elevate the prices in the German market. Instead of holding that 
an airtight territorial protection restricts intrabrand competition and 
automatically yiolates Article 81 (1), eyen if it promotes interbrand 
competition, a U.S. court first would have defined the relevant market 
in order to determine Nungesser's market share, the market shares of 
other actual or potential competitors, and the possible existence of 
barriers to entry into the market. If the analysis of the relevant market 
235 See Sylvania, 43:~ U.S. at 49. Notice though that minimum resale maintenance still is 
per se illegal. Khan, 522 U.S. at 3. 
236 Fox, slIjJra note ,n, at 156. 
237 The Commission, howeyer, is likely to dear an exdusiye license when (i) the licen-
sor and the licensees are permitted to sell in the whole of the common market and they 
are likely to do so giYen that the licensed products can be transported reiatiYely easily and 
inexpensively, and (ii) the combined market shares of the panics in the releyant market is 
not noticeable. Sl'e Commission Decision No. 72/25/EEC, [1972] 4 C.M.L.R. D67, ,6 
(Burroughs/Delplanque); Commission Decision No. 72/26/EEC. 4 C.M.L.R. D 72, ,6 
(BulToughs/Geha-V\'erke). The combincd market share of the parties at the date of the 
decision of the relevant product was under 10%. Reg. lVlonograph, slIjJI{l note 2, at 44 n.36. 
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had shown that interbrand competition was vigorous enough to coun-
terbalance the presumed negative impact of the airtight territorial 
restraint, a sustainable reduction in output and increase in prices, 
then the court would have found that the challenged clause was not 
in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.238 Even if a closer substi-
tute would not exert an immediate constraint over Nungesser's ability 
to achieve supracompetitive profits, as long as absolute territorial pro-
tection were necessary for Nungesser to make available a new product 
in the German market, the restraint probably would be justified. 239 
Attempted pretext or sham license schemes to disguise a naked 
horizontal market division scheme have been declared violations of 
Section I of the Shennan Act. In U.S. v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.,240 two 
already competing companies (ALSCO and Crown) in the business of 
manufacturing and distributing cabinets for dispensing linen and pa-
per towels, used a patent license to divide the territory of the relevant 
market and to allocate customers among themselves. 241 Cabinets were 
distributed through linen and towel supply businesses and paper job-
bers.242 
Under the terms of their agreement, ALSCO granted an exclu-
sive license to Crown to use and distribute ALSCO's patented paper 
towel cabinets in the territory of the east of the Mississippi, while AL-
SCO reserved for itself the territory west of the Mississippi. Crown 
also agreed to deal exclusively with ALSCO and not to distribute cabi-
nets of other producers.243 ALSCO reserved the right to distribute on 
an exclusive basis to customers in the linen and cloth towel supply 
business.244 The effect of the agreement was to give Crown the sole 
right to sell the cabinets to paper jobbers in the eastern United States 
and to reserve to ALSCO the linen supply company customers in that 
area. All customers west of the Mississippi were also reserved to· AL-
SCO.245 
238 After NUllgessl'l; the E.Cj., despite not judging absolute territorial protection 
clauses under Ihe Rule of Reason but under the ancillary restraints doctrine, has ruled 
that, in some situations, absolute territorial protection clauses are compatible with Article 
81(1). Erauw:Jacquery, 1988 E.C.R. 1919, Grounds ,20; Coditel SA, 1982 E.C.R. 3381 
Grounds,20. 
239 Fox, supra note 31, at 159. 
2~O Crown Zellerbach COil]., 141 F. Supp. 118. 
211 ld. at 123. 
2421d. 
243 ld. at 123-24. 
244 ld. at 124. 
245 Crown Zellerbach COIP., HI F. Supp. at 124. 
2000) Exclusivity Clauses in Licensing AgH'elnellts 137 
Competition between the respective distributors of Crown and 
ALSCO was foreclosed by Crown's agreement that it would not sell or 
lease any cabinets to replace cloth or paper towel cabinets installed by 
any of ALSCO's distributors, and by ALSCO's agreement that any of 
its linen supply company distributors who replaced cabinets installed 
by one of Crown's distributors would lose the right to protection from 
competition from Crown's distributors. 246 
On the basis of Section 261 of the Patent Act, the court held that 
a territorial protection granted under a license agreement was a valid 
exercise of ALCO's patent rights. 247 However, the court rejected 
Crown's argument that the patent license justified the allocation of 
customers.248 The court ruled that customers' allocations are not im-
munized by the patent laws and therefore, according to the control-
ling precedents249 constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act. 250 
2. The U.S. Agencies' Intellectual Property Guidelines 
The IP Guidelines are consistent with the jurisprudence of the 
U.S. courts regarding territorial restraints. The first difference with 
the approach of the Commission towards exclusive licenses is that the 
U.S. agencies do not differentiate between open exclusive licenses 
and licenses granting absolute territorial protection. This distinction 
reflects the concern of the Commission and European Community 
Courts about the market divisions that may be originated within the 
common market by the organization of a distribution system with ex-
clusive distributors. 251 
Unlike in the E.U., where an exclusive license agreement is per se 
illegal unless exempted,252 the IP Guidelines state that an exclusive 
license agreement raises antitrust concerns only if the licensees them-
selves, or the licensor and the licensees, are in a horizontal relation-
ship.253 A horizontal relationship is defined in Section 3.3 of the IP 
Guidelines as a relationship between the licensor and its licensees, or 
246lrl. 
247 lrl. at 127. 
248 lrl. at 128. 
249 Addyston Pij)e & Steel Co., 175 U.S. 211. 
250 Crown Zellerbach COlt)., 141 F. Supp. at 127-28. 
251 Fox, s\1pra note 31, at 158-59; see also Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC 
Competition Policy, European Commission, COM (96) 721 final, Brussels, 22.01.1997, 
[1997]4CMLR519,520. 
252 See Burro\1ghs/Delplanque, supra note 237; Burroughs/Geha-Werke, suj)ra note 
237. 
253 IP Guidelines, sllpra note 1, § 4.1.2. 
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between licensees, in which the parties would have been actual or po-
tential competitors in the relevant market in the absence of a license. 
On this point, the Commission's analysis differs from that of the U.S. 
agencies. According to the IP Guidelines, territorial restraints may 
raise problems in arrangements between parties who are competitors 
already, such as cross-licensing by parties collectively possessing mar-
ket power,254 grantbacks,255 and acquisitions of intellectual property 
rights. 256 
Unlike the Technology Transfer Regulation, the IP Guidelines do 
not contain time limitations on territorial exclusivity. This is perhaps 
one of the pivotal differences from the E.U. approach. The lack of 
time constraints on territorial protection clauses in U.S. antitrust law 
stems from the fact that, unlike in the E.u., the principal form of 
analysis in U.S. antitrust law is the Rule of Reason, rather than a for-
malistic system based on the idea that any restriction of conduct 
amounts to a restriction of competition and, therefore, must be pro-
hibited. 
The U.S. agencies' more flexible approach towards territorial 
restrictions in license agreements and other restraints in technology 
transfer agreements in general also is reflected by the adoption within 
the IP Guidelines of a market share safe harbor.257 The IP Guidelines 
indicate that "absent extraordinary circumstances," the U.S. agencies 
will not challenge a restraint in an intellectual property agreement if 
the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and if the licensor and the 
licensees collectively account for no more than twenty percent of each 
relevant market significantly affected by the restraint. This safety zone 
does not apply to those transfers of intellectual property rights to 
which the merger analysis is applied. 
Determination of whether a license agreement falls within the 
safety zone is decided by reference only to goods markets unless the 
analysis of goods markets alone will not adequately address the effects 
of the licensing agreement on competition among technologies or in 
research and development. If an examination of the effects on com-
petition among technologies is required and market shares cannot be 
ascertained, the U.S. agencies will not challenge a restraint in a li-
2[>4 Id. § 5.5; see Article 5 of COli un iss ion Regulation 240/96. 
255 IP Guidelines, sllpra note 1, § 5.6; see Articles 2(1) (4) and 3(6) of Commission 
Regulation 240/96. 
256 IP Guidelines, sllpra note 1, § 5.7. 
257 ld. § 4.3. 
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cense agreement if the restraint is not facially anticompetitive and 
there are four or more independent sources of technology. 
The Technology Transfer Regulation does not contain a safety 
zone similar to that contained in the IP Guidelines. Given the nature 
of a block exemption, it is not necessary to have one because agree-
ments covered by the block exemption are not caught by Article 
81 (1). The only safety zone available to parties to a license agreement 
that falls within the jurisdiction of the Commission is that established 
in the Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance.258 
However, there is a basic difference between the "de minimis" rule of 
the Notice and the safe harbor of the IP Guidelines. A restrictive 
agreement falling outside the Notice is automatically void under Arti-
cle 81 (2), while a restraint falling outside the IP Guidelines' safe har-
bor still is subject to a Rule of Reason analysis and could be exoner-
ated. 259 
Finally, the IP Guidelines note that certain transfers of intellec-
tual property rights are most appropriately analyzed under the 
merger control provisions. The U.S. agencies will apply the merger 
analysis to an outright sale by an intellectual property owner of all of 
its rights to that intellectual property and to a transaction in which a 
person obtains an exclusive license for intellectual property through a 
grant, sale, or other transfer. An exclusive license in this context is a 
license that precludes all other persons, including the licensor, from 
using the licensed intellectual property. These transactions are as-
sessed mainly under Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the principles 
set out in the U.S. agencies Merger Guidelines of 1992.260 
CONCLUSION 
The transfer of intellectual property rights traditionally has 
played and still plays an important role in the domestic economies of 
the E.U. and the U.S. Until roughly twenty-five years ago, few transac-
tions were likely to have significant anticompetitive impacts on for-
eign jurisdictions.261 Indeed, it was not until 1972 that the Commis-
sion issued its first two decisions on the compatibility of exclusive 
manufacturing licenses with Article 81 (1).262 Thus, businesses engag-
258 1997 OJ. (C 372) 1,~, 'lI'lI 9-11; sel'Bdght, slIjJm note 15, at 33-11. 
259 See id.; Reg. Monograph, sujJI"(J note 2. at 30. 
260 IP Guidelines, slljJl"a note 1, § 5.7. 
'261 James B. Kobak,Jr., Running thl' Gallntlrt: Antitrust and 111 Mlutllal Pm/Jert)' PitJalll 0/1 
the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64 ANTITRUST LJ. 341. 341 (1996). 
262 Burroughs/Delplanque, mjJm note 237; Burroughs/Geha-Werke, sli/Ha note 237. 
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ing in international business transactions in the Community prior to 
the 1970s had no reason to be concerned about having their license 
agreements declared void pursuant to EC competition law.263 
There certainly were exceptions, and one could speculate that 
the Commission was notified of many license agreements in which at 
least one of the parties was a non-EC company since the early 1970s 
and during the subsequent years. Most industries were only beginning 
to internationalize and their operations and ventures in other coun-
tries were often limited or fledgling. 
Since the early 1970s, the situation has evolved primarily due to 
three factors: (i) the growth of new technologies which made neces-
sary the use of technology transfer agreements, (ii) the steady global-
ization of production and marketing processes, and (iii) the growing 
concern among industrialized nations about the need to improve in-
tellectual property protection. These factors are likely to have fostered 
a steady increase in technology transfers in international business 
transactions throughout the last two decades. Since the mid-1980s, the 
new advances in information and communication technologies, in 
biotechnology, and in the development of new materials have demon-
strated how vital intellectual property can be in the promotion of 
economic growth. 264 
The growth of new technologies in the E.U. and the U.S., along 
with the increasing globalization of the economy which took place 
throughout the 1990s has made transactions involving the transfer 
and use of technology more likely than ever to raise antitrust issues.265 
This phenomenon underlies the need to have a coherent set of anti-
trust rules for license agreements in the E.U. and the U.S. 
263 This lack of concern was partially supported by the Commission Notice of 1962 
(the "Christmas Message") in which the Commission took the view that limited patent 
licenses did not infringe Article 81 (1) because some of the restrictions upon the licensee, 
such as territorial restrictions, field-of-use restrictions, or limitations in time, were inherent 
to the patent rights of the licensor. Notice on Patent Licensing Agreements, 1962 OJ. 
2922/62. 
264 OECD COMPETITION POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 7 (1989). 
265 See Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III, International Cooperation in Antitrust En-
forcement, Address at the Illinois State Bar Association International Trade Program, at 
http://\\'Ww.ftc.gov/speeches/ starek/ illbar.htm (May 10, 1996). (" [al ntitrust is becoming 
increasingly importan t to American finns because they are engaging in more and more 
international transactions. A finn lIlust be carefully alluned not only to the antitrust laws 
of the United States but also to the competition policies and antitrust enforcement re-
gimes of the other nations in which it operates."). See also Kobak, slipra note 261, at 341; 
Sara M. Biggers, Richard A. Mann, & Barry S. Roberts, Illtellectual ProjJl'rty ({lid Alltitrust: A 
COllljJm7S0ft of Evolution ill the Ellropeall ['lIioll (Illd Ullited States. 22 HASTINGS INT'!. & COMPo 
L. RE\,. 209, 209 (1999). 
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The new Technology Transfer Regulation is one step forward in 
the convergence of EC competition law and U.S. antitrust law in the 
area of exclusive licensing agreements. There are many provisions 
that the Commission now perceives ex ante rather than ex post.266 How-
ever, there still are significant differences between the systems. 
Territorial restrictions in license agreements are more or less 
presumptively lawful in the U.S. since the demise of the Schwinn case 
and are regarded with favor by the IP Guidelines.267 However, the 
Commission is likely to consider a territorial protection clause in a 
license agreement contrary to Article 81 (1) but exemptable either 
under the Technology Transfer Regulation or under an individual 
exemption granted by the Commission pursuant to Article 81 (3) of 
the EC Treaty. Clauses granting absolute territorial protection to the 
li'censee are prohibited under Article 81 (1) (and therefore null and 
void under Article 81 (2», and it is highly unlikely that the Commis-
sion will grant an individual exemption to one of those clauses under 
Article 81 (3). 
This pivotal difference regarding territorial restraints is rooted in 
the disparate attitudes towards market integration in U.S. agencies 
and the Commission. The objective of single market integration ex-
plains the reluctance of the Commission to accept the Chicago 
School's line of thought that if a transaction is vertical, it is unlikely to 
be anticompetitive because the licensor has no incentive to give more 
protection than is necessary to induce its licensees' investment. Under 
this reasoning, as it has been understood by U.S. agencies and courts, 
the test is whether territorial restrains unreasonably restrain trade, 
not whether they have a market partitioning effect. This test is prima 
facie incompatible with the objective of market integration as under-
stood by the Commission, as a process in which intrabrand competi-
tion plays a crucial integrating function. 
The acceptance in the E. U. of the approach proposed by the 
Chicago School would require the Commission to analyze the eco-
nomic conditions of the relevant market before condemning a re-
straint of conduct under Article 81 (1) and would deprive the Com-
mission of its power to grant exemptions. The Commission and the 
E.C]. have endorsed the practice of treating restrictions of conduct as 
infringing article 81 (1) unless they are exempted.268 This formalistic 
266 Reg. Monog,-aph. snlna note 2. at 251. 
26i IP Guidelines. sl/j)m note 1. § 4.1.2. 
268 An example of the COlllmission's zeal on monitoring exclusive license agreements 
can be found in the Commission decision in the Drl1lidson R1lbber case. [1972] C.I\1.L.R. D 
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approach ensures, according to the Commission's view, progress in 
the attainment of the single market because it enables the Commis-
sion to act in a regulatory fashion to require parties to modify their 
agreements before it grants an exemption or sends a comfort letter.269 
Finally, the Commission should revise its restrictive approach to-
wards territorial restraints in license agreements in recognition of the 
achievements that have been made in moving towards a single mar-
ket. A restrictive policy towards vertical restraints, and towards territo-
rial restraints in license agreements in particular, hinders single mar-
ket integration by discouraging the use of innovation and deterring 
licensors from engaging in license agreements in different Member 
States. This may encourage development outside the E.U. 
Ideally, further convergence on the legality of license agreements 
under the antitrust laws of the E.U. and the U.S. should take the form 
of a change in the E.U. from a formalistic system based on the per se 
rule to a more flexible system for evaluating restraints of conduct 
based on a Rule of Reason. Some of the E.C.].'s judgments have made 
significant inroads in this regard,270 although the Commission often 
has treated them as irrelevant.271 
The "White Paper on Modernization of the Rules Implementing 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty" has made clear that the Commis-
sion is not planning to adopt a Rule of Reason.272 The maintenance of 
a modified formula (i.e., the Commission is planning to abolish the 
compulsory notification system) of the traditional approach towards 
the application of Article 81 (1) does not mean that a reform of the 
52. In this case, a U.S. company, Davidson, granted exclusive patent and know-how licenses 
to several European licensees m'el' a new technology to make elbow rests and seat cush-
ions. Davidson agreed not to appoint other licensees in the granted territories. The Com-
mission held that the exclusive licenses violated Article 81 (1) on the grounds that they 
prevented Davidson from giving thinl parties, through the grant of further licenses, the 
possihility of also exploiting its patents. The Commission, however, granted an exemption 
under Article 81 (3) because (i) the exclusive territories were "indispensable" if the tech-
nology was to be made available in Europe, (ii) there wel'e other competing processes, and 
(iii) the licensees were not prevented fi'om selling the licensed products outside its territo-
ries. " 47-48. The question that arises h'om this case is whether the Commission should 
have cleared directly Davidson's license agreements, given that ex ante no competition was 
restricted in the comlllon market, instead of granling an exemption. 
269 See Deacon, supra note 59, at ,108. 
270 See, inter alia. Nungesser, 1982 E.C.R. 2018. 2073; Case 234/89. Delimitis, 1991 
E.C.R. 935; Langnese, 1995 E.C.R. 11-1533; Case T- 9/93, Scholler Lebensmittel, 1995 
E.C.R.II-1611. 
271 Korah, supra note 31. at '~99. 
272 V.l1ite Paper, sujJI'(l no Ie 22. at 17. 
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Technology Transfer Regulation, in particular in the area of territo-
rial restraints, is no longer necessary. 
Instead, the time limits to territorial restrictions in license 
agreements laid down by the Regulation appear to be no longer justi-
fied on the grounds of the objective of single market integration. Ac-
cordingly, the Commission should engage in a thorough analysis as to 
the need to amend the Regulation in favor of an extension or repeal 
of the ten year limit for exclush'e know-how agreements and some-
times mixed agreements, as well as the extension of the five year limi-
tation to the prohibition of passive sales between licensees in license 
agreements to at least ten years. In addition, time limits should only 
start to run from the date of the license concerned and not from the 
date a licensee first placed the product in the common market. 
